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1453 
Article 
Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law 
Deborah Tuerkheimer†
 INTRODUCTION  
 
One in every five women in the United States is raped in 
her lifetime.1 Of women victimized by rape, half are raped by 
an intimate partner, and forty percent by an acquaintance.2 
This ninety percent of rape departs in fundamental ways from 
the standard rape paradigm.3 It is barely touched by the crimi-
nal justice system.4
 
†  Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. J.D., Yale Law 
School; A.B., Harvard College. For extremely helpful comments on earlier 
drafts, I am grateful to Cynthia Bowman, Bridget Crawford, Andrew Gold, 
Aya Gruber, Dan Markel, Laura Rosenbury, Marc Spindelman, Robin West, 
and participants at the Feminism and Criminal Law Workshop at the Univer-
sity of Colorado Law School. Copyright © 2014 by Deborah Tuerkheimer. 
 Yet this kind of rape is seldom isolated for 
conceptual analysis. 
 1. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VI-
OLENCE SURVEY (NISVS): 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 18 (2011) [hereinafter 
NISVS]. For purposes of the survey, rape is defined as “any completed or at-
tempted unwanted vaginal (for women), oral, or anal penetration through the 
use of physical force (such as being pinned or held down, or by the use of vio-
lence) or threats to physically harm and includes times when the victim was 
drunk, high, drugged, or passed out and unable to consent.” Id. at 17. Prior to 
publication of the NISVS, the incidence of non-stranger rape in relation to 
stranger rape was thought to be significantly lower, albeit still the sizeable 
majority of rapes. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006 STATISTICAL 
TABLES tbl.27 (2008), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cvus0602.pdf.  
 2. NISVS, supra note 1, at 21.  
 3. See infra notes 315–19 and accompanying text.  
 4. As David P. Bryden explained: 
Whatever their other disputes, rape-law scholars agree about several 
fundamental realities. They agree that, for practical purposes, forcible 
rape is really two crimes. The consensus is that the criminal justice 
system performs at least reasonably well in dealing with ‘aggravated’ 
rapes, defined as rapes by strangers, or men with weapons, or where 
the victim suffers ulterior injuries. With equal unanimity, scholars 
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This Article concerns itself explicitly with this kind of 
rape—non-stranger rape. It is also very much about women 
and consensual sex. In the midst of rampant sexual violence, 
most women (and girls) are having sex, often frequently.5
 
agree that the justice system often has performed poorly in cases in-
volving rapes by unarmed acquaintances (dates, lovers, neighbors, co-
workers, employers, and so on) and in which the victim suffers no ad-
ditional injuries. Victims are less likely to report these acquaintance 
rapes (or even to recognize that they are rapes); if a victim does report 
it, the police are less likely to believe her; prosecutors are less likely 
to file charges; juries are less likely to convict; and any decision by an 
appellate court is more likely to be controversial.  
 The 
David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 317–18 (2000) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1161 
(1986) (“The available data suggest that while violent, stranger rape may be 
among the most frequently reported crimes in this country, the non-traditional 
rape—the case involving non-strangers, less force, no beatings, no weapons—
may be among the least frequently reported, even when its victims perceive it 
to be ‘rape.’ In many if not most of these cases, forced sex is tolerated by its 
victims as unavoidable, if not ‘normal.’”).  
 5. Not long before the CDC issued the NISVS, one of the largest repre-
sentative studies of human sexuality ever conducted was published. The Na-
tional Survey of Sexual Health and Behavior (NSSHB), conducted by re-
searchers from the Center for Sexual Health Promotion at Indiana 
University’s School of Health, Physical Education and Recreation, describes 
the sexual experiences and condom-use behaviors of 5865 adolescents and 
adults, ages fourteen to ninety-four. Initial findings from the survey, present-
ed in nine separate research articles, were published in October 2010 in a spe-
cial issue of The Journal of Sexual Medicine. Ctr for Sexual Health Promotion, 
National Survey of Sexual Health and Behavior, IND. U., http://www 
.nationalsexstudy.indiana.edu (last updated 2010). The survey found that at 
least 40% of women between the ages of twenty and forty-nine have engaged 
in anal sex, and most have engaged in oral sex. Debby Herbenick et al., Sexual 
Behavior in the United States: Results from a National Probability Sample of 
Men and Women Ages 14–94, 7 J. SEXUAL MED. 255, 262–63 tbl.3 (2010). Even 
compared to research from the early 1990s, these proportions have increased 
(significantly in the case of anal sex). Id. at 261. Vaginal sex continues to be 
the most common sexual behavior overall. Ninety-eight percent of women be-
tween the ages of twenty-five and forty-four have engaged in vaginal sex, over 
half with between three and fourteen partners in their lifetime. ANJANI 
CHANDRA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. 
REP. NO. 36, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, SEXUAL ATTRACTION, AND SEXUAL IDENTITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 2006–2008 NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
FAMILY GROWTH 1, 19 tbl.3 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
nhsr/nhsr036.pdf. Girls frequently become sexually active as adolescents: 
about 20%between the ages of fourteen and seventeen engage in oral sex, and 
over 30% report vaginal intercourse by the age of sixteen. J. Dennis 
Fortenberry et al., Sexual Behaviors and Condom Use at Last Vaginal Inter-
course: A National Sample of Adolescents Ages 14 to 17 Years, 7 J. SEXUAL 
MED. 305, 309–10 tbl.2 (2010).  
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latest empirical evidence is consistent with the insistence of a 
younger generation of women that sex is to be celebrated.6
The rise of sex positivity co-exists uneasily with the com-
monplace nature of rape. While this tension has gone unnoticed 
by legal theorists,
  
7 new impetus for sustained attention has 
been provided by the most significant feminist initiative to 
have emerged in decades: women are insisting on sex without 
rape and sexuality without judgment in a movement8
 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 
 that calls 
110–15 (discussing sex positivity as 
a fundamental tenet of third wave feminism).  
 7. See infra Part II.B.  
 8. Whether SlutWalk is considered a social movement (as opposed to a 
social mobilization) depends on which of many working definitions is applied. 
One commonly invoked formulation is Sidney Tarrow’s, which includes “collec-
tive challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sus-
tained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” SIDNEY TARROW, 
POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 4 (2d 
ed. 1998) (emphasis omitted). Another explains social movements as “con-
scious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some as-
pect of their society by using extra-institutional means.” Jeff Goodwin & 
James M. Jasper, Editors’ Introduction to THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER: 
CASES AND CONCEPTS 3, 3 (Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper eds., 2003). For a 
summary of various definitions, see generally David A. Snow et al., Mapping 
the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 3, 6–11 
(David A. Snow et al. eds., 2004).  
Beyond the definitional question, Tomiko Brown-Nagin has provided this 
helpful overview of how social movements tend to operate: 
Social movement activity is characterized by organization, cohesion, 
and agenda setting. A social movement typically includes groups of 
people who, meeting in a safe social space, come together to caucus, 
and collaborate over a common grievance. The members of the collec-
tive develop a plan of action, or devise strategies and tactics, for 
achieving their goals. They commonly use direct action, such as 
demonstrations, marches, or sit-ins; community organizing, which 
typically includes community education or “consciousness-raising” 
sessions; and petitioning and pamphleteering to achieve the move-
ment’s goals. There is an express role for emotion in social movements 
because breaking mental chains of oppression, creating new forms of 
cultural expression, and awakening participants from quiescence are 
fundamental to the initiation, growth, and development of a move-
ment. Public performance of the cognitively liberated self and dis-
plays of unity are integral to sustaining movement cohesion and gain-
ing the public’s attention.  
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Af-
firmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1504–05 (2005) (footnotes omit-
ted). Because it shares many of these features, I will refer to SlutWalk as a 
social movement, although none of my claims rest on this characterization. 
The discussion that follows does, however, set the stage for further application 
of social movement theory to criminal law reform. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 419, 421 (2001) (advocating “an important rather than marginal role for 
law and legal theory in the social movements literature”).  
  
1456 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1453 
 
itself SlutWalk.9
Precisely because of the normative claims at stake, it is 
striking that SlutWalk targets rape culture alone,
 By taking aim at rape while expressly promot-
ing the virtues of female sexuality, SlutWalk situates itself 
where anti-rape and pro-sex norms converge.  
10 leaving law 
and legal theory outside the bounds of protest.11 This omission 
reflects a profound underestimation of the role of law.12 I say 
this not simply because greater enforcement of rape laws13
 
 9. See generally SLUTWALK TORONTO, http://www.slutwalktoronto.com 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (describing the movement and its origins). 
 
 10. Rape culture has been aptly described as follows:  
[I]f a woman previously consented to any connection with a man—
developing a friendship with a male colleague or superior at work, ac-
cepting a date, going to a bar or a party and talking with a man (i.e., 
making a stranger a nonstranger through conversation), agreeing to 
drive a man she has just met to his home, allowing a man she just 
met to drive her home, dating a man for an extended period of time, 
consenting to sexual relations with a man once or many times, cohab-
itating with a man, marrying a man—a presumption arises that she 
subsequently consented to sexual contact during the incident in ques-
tion. [Also], she is considered responsible for having placed herself in 
a situation that might result in sexual contact, and, therefore, she 
must accept the consequences of her own conduct (i.e., nonconsensual 
sexual contact). 
Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: 
Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599, 604–05 (1991) (footnotes omitted).  
 11. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Principles, Practices, and 
Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946 (2006) (“The law needs social 
movements, even as social movements disrupt legal orderings. Social move-
ments continuously integrate law and the institutions of civil society. They 
connect legal norms to the beliefs and practices of ordinary people, so as to 
preserve a relationship between what the law regards as licit and what the 
public does. This connection to the social order secures the normative vitality 
of the law, making it legitimate, efficacious, and practically enforceable.”). In 
conclusion, I will outline the parameters of law reform consistent with 
SlutWalk’s normative aims.  
 12. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 420 (“Any kind of collective action, however 
‘spontaneous’ (a favorite word among social movement theorists), occurs in the 
context of the regulatory state. The norms challenged by this kind of collective 
action are likely to be codified in legal codes, and the movement’s struggle will 
inevitably involve law. . . . [L]aw has strong effects on social movements; law 
does not drive them, but it is a pervasive positive and normative context in 
which the social movement operates.”). 
 13. For proof of continuing problems of under-enforcement, see David P. 
Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1216 (1997) (citing studies confirming the disparity in 
prosecutorial treatment of stranger and acquaintance rape cases); Cassia 
Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charg-
ing Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and 
Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 682 (2001) (finding evidence that in cases 
involving “acquaintances, relatives, or intimate partners . . . prosecutors’ an-
ticipation of a consent defense and downstream orientation toward judges and 
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would likely deter more rape,14 and impact rape culture along 
the way.15
Rather than critique criminal process, I contemplate the 
substantive law of rape. I do so with particular attention to 
sexual agency—a perspective informed by close investigation of 
SlutWalk.
 While this is true, my orientation is somewhat dif-
ferent.  
16 As we will see, synthesis of the movement’s anti-
rape and pro-sex strands leads to a new understanding of sexu-
al agency, along with the dilemmas it presents. This more com-
plicated rendition has until now been neglected—in part be-
cause recent developments have altered the terrain. I offer a 
conceptual framework that begins to fill this void.17
Rethinking sexual agency in turn recasts the law of rape.
  
18 
On close inspection, we see that judgments about the bounds of 
appropriate sexual conduct permeate rape law, functioning to 
contract simultaneously the scope of protection from sexual vio-
lence and the realm of legally approved sex.19
Part One explains how SlutWalk evolved, evaluating its 
tenets and practices in the context of a third-wave feminism 
 The crime of rape 
thus constructs female sexuality in ways that contrast sharply 
with a pro-agency agenda. This is why women cannot “reclaim” 
sexuality, as SlutWalk professes to do, without regard for rape 
law.  
 
juries apparently lead them to scrutinize the victim’s character and behavior 
more carefully”); see also Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Vio-
lence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 
VILL. L. REV. 907, 929 (2001) (“By unfounding and downgrading crimes involv-
ing violence against women, police departments neglect to investigate hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of legitimate rape complaints every year.”). 
 14. See Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 
170–71 (1992) (explaining why criminal justice sanctions are likely to deter 
non-stranger rape effectively). 
 15. Id. at 132 (“[Law and culture] reciprocally influence understandings of 
what is and is not the crime of rape.”).   
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. Legal feminism generally proceeds from the proposition that theory is 
enriched by the incorporation of contemporary feminist practice. As Martha 
Chamallas succinctly notes, “[a]s it has in the past, practice will drive theory 
and will keep feminist legal theory alive.” Martha Chamallas, Past as Pro-
logue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 157, 174 (2010); see 
also infra note 35.  
 18. More specifically, I contend that rape law is constructing female sexu-
ality and that it is doing so in ways antithetical to sexual agency. See infra 
Part III. This leads me to introduce new criteria for evaluating the adequacy of 
rape law and to suggest a different way of thinking about the direction of re-
form. See infra notes 315–30 and accompanying text.  
 19. See infra Part III. 
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that departs appreciably from what has come before. Part Two 
explores SlutWalk’s demand for sex without rape. It then de-
velops a model of sexual agency that arises from consideration 
of the movement’s objectives and the tensions that surround 
them. Part Three describes how rape law constructs female 
sexuality. It accomplishes this through a critique of consent 
doctrine20 and the rape shield rule,21 challenging the law’s 
treatment of the sexually passive woman22 and the sexually de-
viant woman, respectively.23
I.  NOT YOUR MOTHER’S FEMINISM   
 What emerges from this analysis 
is that rape law ought to be reformed to account for women’s 
sexual agency, thereby furthering the same. A conclusion out-
lines the parameters of a new approach to condemning rape. 
In order not to be raped, women should “avoid dressing like 
sluts.”24 When a Toronto police officer made this observation in 
January 2011, he galvanized a worldwide protest known as 
SlutWalk.25 In less than a year, the grassroots initiative spread 
to over one hundred cities, including New York, Berlin, Cape 
Town, New Delhi, London, Chicago, Mexico City, Vienna, Hel-
sinki, Buenos Aires, and Singapore, as well as smaller towns 
and college campuses across the United States.26
 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 To date, tens 
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. Why?, SLUTWALK TORONTO, http://www.slutwalktoronto.com/about/ 
why (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).  
 25. SlutWalk Toronto’s website provides an overview of the initiative’s 
origins. See id.  
 26. Heather Jarvis, one of SlutWalk Toronto’s organizers, has offered this 
reflection:  
SlutWalk has gone from a small idea in our city of Toronto to a multi-
faceted initiative across cities, borders, languages and cultures that 
takes many forms. We’ve seen SlutWalks, Marchas de las Putas, 
Marches des Salopes, Marcha de las Vadias, La Marcha de las 
Vagabundas, Marches to End Victim-Blaming, Marsul Panaramelor, 
Consent Fests, Besharmi Morcha, fundraisers, workshops, communi-
ty education initiatives, collaborations, campaigns, art initiatives, 
open mic events, spaces to share survivor stories, community ac-
countability work and more. We are in disbelief, especially when we 
think of the grassroots nature of SlutWalk, that SlutWalk has grown 
to mobilize thousands of people in many ways, with every SlutWalk 
rooted in its respective city. 
Heather Jarvis, From the Ground Up: A Response to an Open Letter and the 
Beginning of an Action Plan for Better Work with Our Communities, 
SLUTWALK TORONTO (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.slutwalktoronto.com/from 
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of thousands of people, mostly women—many of whom disavow 
any attempt to reclaim the word slut27—have participated in 
the effort,28 and the mobilization continues.29
In this Part, I show that SlutWalk manifests a new itera-
tion of feminism.
  
30 I will first describe the features of the 
movement, as it is often called,31 that mark it as feminist.32 I 
will then explain how this movement is fundamentally different 
from what has come before.33 My methodological approach is 
grounded in women’s articulated experiences of SlutWalk, 
whether as organizers, joiners, skeptics, observers, or critics.34 
The method uses practice to inform theory.35
 
-the-ground-up. Because the remainder of this discussion focuses on SlutWalk 
in the US (and domestic rape law), I do not describe the ways in which women 
around the world are adapting SlutWalk to account for cultural variations, or 
how the movement bears on the state of global feminism. For one of many il-
lustrations of SlutWalk’s international resonance, see Rita Banerji, SlutWalk 
to Femicide: Making the Connection, THE WIP (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www 
.thewip.net/contributors/2011/09/slutwalk_to_femicide_making_th.html (ex-
plaining the importance of SlutWalk for women in India).  
  
 27. See infra note 155.  
 28. Jarvis, supra note 26. 
 29. At the 2012 National Sexual Assault Conference, it was noted that 
SlutWalk rallies had already taken place in more than 200 cities worldwide. 
Colleen Westendorf, Commc’n Dir., SlutWalk Toronto, Speech at the National 
Sexual Assault Conference (Aug. 22, 2012) (transcript available at http://www 
.slutwalktoronto.com/slutwalk-toronto-speech-from-the-2012-national-sexual 
-assault-conference-in-chicago-nsac2012). In 2013, many cities held their third 
annual SlutWalk march. See, e.g., SlutWalk Chicago 2013: Third Annual 
March Protests Rape Culture, Victim-Blaming, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 
2013, 1:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/slutwalk-chicago 
-2013_n_3901085.html; SlutWalk Seattle 2013, SLUTWALK SEATTLE, http:// 
slutwalkseattle.com/SWS13 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014); see also Jazmine Fos-
ter-Hall, UA, Tucson Community March Against Rape Culture in ‘SlutWalk’, 
THE DAILY WILDCAT (Nov. 16, 2013, 7:14 PM), http://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/ 
article/2013/11/ua-tucson-community-march-against-rape-culture-in-slutwalk. 
In other locations, activists are continuing to advance SlutWalk’s mission un-
der the auspices of new feminist organizations. See, e.g., Letter from Former 
SlutWalk NYC Organizers (Mar. 4, 2012) (available at http://www.facebook 
.com/pages/SlutWalk-NYC/195661440475800). 
 30. Often this latest incarnation is referred to as “third-wave” feminism. 
For an excellent overview, see Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave 
Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleas-
ure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 106–133 (2007).  
 31. Again, my argument does not depend on whether this classification is 
sound. See supra text accompanying note 8.  
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 36–65.  
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 66–76. 
 34. Throughout this Part, in addition to press accounts, I rely on blog en-
tries written by rally organizers, blog entries recording participants’ impres-
sions, and blog entries articulating the concerns of those who have declined to 
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SlutWalk is best understood as a feminist initiative,36 not-
withstanding its fundamental points of departure from earlier 
feminisms.37 Beyond the particulars of its agenda, which I will 
explore shortly,38 the protest has a good deal in common with 
accepted feminist practices.39 In particular, SlutWalk reaffirms 
the importance of consciousness-raising40
 
join the movement. All told, blog traffic around SlutWalk has been quite size-
able. See infra text accompanying note 
 and the continuing 
69 (describing SlutWalk’s use of the 
internet as an organizing tool); cf. Emily Nussbaum, The Rebirth of the Femi-
nist Manifesto, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 30, 2011, at 42, 44 (“[T]he blogosphere has 
transformed feminist conversation, reviving in the process an older style of 
activism among young women.”).  
 35. This method is central to legal feminism. As Deborah Rhode has ex-
plained, “[c]ritical feminism’s most common response to questions about its 
own authority has been reliance on experiential analysis. This approach draws 
primarily on techniques of consciousness-raising in contemporary feminist or-
ganizations, but also on pragmatic philosophical traditions. A standard prac-
tice is to begin with concrete experiences, integrate these experiences into the-
ory, and rely on theory for a deeper understanding of the experiences.” 
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 621 
(1990).  
 36. This perspective is widely, but not universally, recognized. See Kathy 
Miriam, Branding Feminism, DIALECTICAL SPIN (Oct. 23, 2011), http:// 
kmiriam.wordpress.com/tag/slutwalk/#_edn1 (“[T]he only thing that’s parodic 
about Slutwalk, albeit inadvertently, is the event’s appropriation of femi-
nism.”) See generally Link Round Up: Feminist Critiques of SlutWalk, FEMI-
NIST FREQUENCY (May 16, 2011), http://www.feministfrequency.com/2011/05/ 
link-round-up-feminist-critiques-of-slutwalk (providing links to articles and 
blog posts critiquing SlutWalk from a feminist perspective).  
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 66–76 (discussing these differ-
ences). 
 38. See infra Part II. 
 39. Like previous generations of feminists, SlutWalk’s organizers profess 
a commitment to non-hierarchical institutional structures. See Jarvis, supra 
note 26 (“We do not envision our activism as a hierarchical dictation of our 
ideas upon others.”).What is different about this initiative is the extent to 
which it is diffuse (a state further enabled by the internet) and thus far largely 
unaffiliated with existing women’s organizations. As Heather Jarvis, SlutWalk 
Toronto co-organizer, describes it, “SlutWalk was an idea that began in Toron-
to and has spread across the world at lightning speed, which can and does lim-
it our reach and influence over other SlutWalks, especially since everything 
we do is volunteer-run. Each SlutWalk is independently based and organized. 
However, though we at SlutWalk Toronto may not be in other cities as organ-
izers, decision-makers or participants, what happens under the SlutWalk label 
or idea connects us all.” Heather Jarvis, Racism and Anti-Racism: Why They 
Matter to SlutWalks, SLUTWALK TORONTO (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www 
.slutwalktoronto.com/racism-and-anti-racism.  
 40. Consciousness-raising is a quintessential feminist practice. “As femi-
nist writing on ‘consciousness-raising’ has made clear, it may be only through 
conversation with others who have confronted similar feelings that a woman 
becomes aware that her self-conception does not simply reflect her own short-
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power of collective efforts to advance women’s well-being.41 By 
aggregating individual experiences, women are able to discern 
shared meaning in previously atomized existences. As a result, 
new forms of collective action become possible.42
Like the Take Back the Night rallies before it,
  
43 SlutWalk 
seeks to spread awareness—to women who have been raped 
and to others—of the prevalence and harm of rape.44
 
comings, but is a function of views and expectations that are instilled socially.” 
Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-
Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 827–28 (1999).  
 Using sto-
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 51–64. At least in theory, this em-
phasis on group cohesion contemplates the intersectional nature of identity 
and avoids the pitfalls of essentialism. In practice, however, this recognition 
has proven extremely problematic. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 42. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE 101 (1989) (“Consciousness raising, through socializing women’s know-
ing, transforms it, creating a shared reality that ‘clears a space in the world’ 
within which women can begin to move.” (footnote omitted)).  
 43. This comparison has not been lost on commentators and participants. 
See Rachel Griffin, Black Feminist Reflections on a Small Town SlutWalk, MS. 
MAGAZINE BLOG (Oct. 5, 2011), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2011/10/05/black 
-feminist-reflections-on-a-small-town-slutwalk (“[O]ur local SlutWalk had a 
larger attendance than any of the Take Back the Night marches that I have 
been to or spoken at in the last 10 years.”); Amanda Marcotte, SlutWalks and 
the New Political Incorrectness, SLATE (Apr. 21, 2001, 1:26 PM), http://www 
.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2011/04/21/feminists_now_completely_own_the_ 
funny (contrasting “SlutWalk with its rape-protesting predecessors, the Take 
Back the Night rallies that emerged in the ‘70s and ‘80s”); Salamishah Tillet, 
What to Wear to a SlutWalk, NATION (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.thenation 
.com/article/163679/what-wear-slutwalk# (“SlutWalk has been the most suc-
cessful protest against sexual violence in the United States since the birth of 
the Take Back the Night marches in the 1970s.”). However, important differ-
ences in emphasis between the two protests have gone unremarked. Most no-
tably, in contrast to SlutWalk, Take Back the Night largely targeted stranger 
rape and related sexual dangers associated with public spaces. See Nadine 
Taub, Thoughts on Living and Moving with the Recurring Divide, 24 GA. L. 
REV. 965, 983 (1990) (“[A] spectrum of women have joined together in reclaim-
ing public space. Frequent in the late 1970s, marches have been revived in re-
cent years. The very notion that women are entitled to be on the streets at 
night is a wonderful source of energy for liberating women who learn early on 
where they can and cannot go.”); see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN OUR TIME: 
MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTION 301–02 (1999) (describing the first “Take Back the 
Night” march in 1978); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Re-
joinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1, 46 (1993) (“Women, who are determined to ‘Take Back the Night’ from 
predatory men, have protested throughout the country demanding the right to 
move about freely.”). 
 44. SlutWalk is most often described by its anti-rape commitments. See, 
e.g., Fiona Snyckers, SlutWalk: When Feminists Turn Territorial, THOUGHT 
LEADER (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/fionasnyckers/2011/10/ 
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ries and first-hand accounts,45 the rallies and web-based mobi-
lization protest “slut shaming,” victim blaming, and a rape cul-
ture that excuses sexual violence perpetrated by non-
strangers.46
One theme that resurfaces in participants’ accounts is the 
value of relating experiences of sexual victimization. For in-
stance, as one woman who marched describes it:  
  
I . . . felt a surprising amount of catharsis over my own probable date-
rape; I never blamed myself for it, but that didn’t stop me from feeling 
incredibly pissed off over both the event itself and the daunting odds 
that led me not to have it investigated. To have a bunch of people be 
pissed off along with me felt indescribably awesome; in turn, I was 
pissed off on their behalf, too.47
A younger woman, still in high school, explains,  
 
[a]fter awhile you get tired of being vulnerable . . . . You get tired of 
letting it just happen, and you have to get past the point of just blog 
  
 
03/slutwalk-when-feminists-turn-territorial (calling SlutWalk “inarguably the 
most successful rape-awareness campaign in the world ever”).  
 45. Bridget Crawford has observed that “personal story-telling,” which she 
likens to the consciousness-raising tradition, is a principal method of third-
wave feminism. Crawford, supra note 30, at 124–26. 
 46. In general, stranger rapes (which tend to be perpetrated with a weap-
on or other force) are not culturally accepted, and therefore tend to prompt a 
criminal justice response. See supra text accompanying note 13. In this re-
spect, little has changed since Susan Estrich made this observation decades 
ago in her seminal article on rape: 
The available data suggest that while violent, stranger rape may be 
among the most frequently reported crimes in this country, the non-
traditional rape—the case involving non-strangers, less force, no beat-
ings, no weapons—may be among the least frequently reported, even 
when its victims perceive it to be “rape.” In many if not most of these 
cases, forced sex is tolerated by its victims as unavoidable, if not 
“normal.” 
  Along with victim underreporting, the criminal justice system 
provides a second screen on the understanding of rape. Prosecution 
and conviction rates are highest when force and resistance are great-
est, when the rape is corroborated, when no prior relationship exists 
between victim and defendant, and when the initial contact between 
the two is involuntary. Indeed, when such factors are present, prose-
cution and conviction rates are quite high; when they are not, the case 
is far more likely to be dismissed or at least pleaded out as a minor of-
fense, or if taken to trial, most likely to result in an acquittal.  
Estrich, supra note 4, at 1161–62.  
 47. Jamie Peck, SlutWalk NYC Was Rainy, Beautiful, Inspiring, THE 
GLOSS (Oct. 3, 2011), http://thegloss.com/2011/10/03/odds-and-ends/slutwalk 
-nyc-was-rainy-beautiful-inspiring-453. 
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ging about it. I wanted to do the walk because it was a physical mo-
ment of being around other people who are saying, “No. This has to 
stop.”48
In many of the rallies and online,
  
49 women speak publicly for 
the first time about their rapes. 50
In SlutWalk, women affirm the power of a heterogeneous 
collective. Many participants mention the value of diversity in 
their accounts. For instance, a dispatch from the New York 
City rally notes, “[a]lthough the crowd was overwhelmingly, 
female there were some men there, too. There were people of all 
different races, abilities, genders, ages, weights, orientations, 
you name it . . . . Far from being a homogenously white/ 
straight/female/cisgender affair, speakers included nearly every 
kind of identity there is . . . .”
 
51
 
 48. Tara Kulash, Slut Walk Promotes Right to Bare Legs, DAILY EGYPTIAN 
(Oct. 2, 2011, 7:50 PM), http://archives.dailyegyptian.com/siu-2011/2011/10/2/ 
slut-walk-promotes-right-to-bare-legs.html (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  
 And from Carbondale, Illinois: 
 49. As SlutWalk co-founder Sonya Barnett notes, “[w]e’ve seen many peo-
ple unpack their experiences on the SlutWalk Toronto Facebook page, sharing 
and supporting each other as they deal with what has happened to them.” 
Sonya Barnett, What I’ve Learned, SASKIA VOGEL (Nov. 13, 2011), http:// 
saskiavogel.com/?p=811. Other women have responded to SlutWalk by blog-
ging about their accounts of sexual violence. See, e.g., Jamie Peck, Why I’m 
Participating in SlutWalk NYC Tomorrow, THE GLOSS (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://thegloss.com/2011/09/30/odds-and-ends/why-im-participating-in 
-slutwalk-nyc-tomorrow-963 (describing waking up from “some kind of blacked 
out, vegetative state,” with a vagina that “felt like sandpaper,” and the reali-
zation that “sex was had” with her date despite her inability to recall it). At 
times, these women cite rape culture to explain their reluctance to report their 
sexual assault. See, e.g., id. (“Why didn’t I, a self-identified feminist, get a rape 
kit done and try to piece together what had happened the night before? Be-
cause I knew the system would treat me like shit. I’m naked on the Internet, I 
write about sex, and I basically roofied myself. I knew nobody was going to 
treat me with respect. People much more virginal and less uncertain than me 
have had an infuriatingly tough time getting justice. I didn’t want to put my-
self and my family through that for such an uncertain outcome.”); Tillet, supra 
note 43 (“I was there . . . ‘[c]ause when I took that long walk home after I was 
raped, my spaghetti strapped dress was turned inside out. And I was afraid to 
go to the police and be told it was my fault.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Philip Haldiman, Victims of Rape Share Stories of Healing at 
SlutWalk, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 23, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www 
.azcentral.com/community/tempe/articles/2011/10/23/20111023rape-victims 
-slutwalk.html (“Dozens of Arizona women shared their stories and shed their 
tears Saturday afternoon, healing scars left behind as victims of rape and sex-
ual assault. . . . [T]he majority of those who volunteered to speak shared their 
story publicly for the first time.”).  
 51. Peck, supra note 47. Cisgender means identifying with a gender that 
is the same as one’s biological sex. Cisgender, QUEER DICTIONARY (Aug. 22, 
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“What I saw was a beautifully diverse representation of what 
feminism can look like. That diversity taught me something 
about the significance of SlutWalk.”52 Even where SlutWalk is 
perceived to have fallen short,53 the notion of a diverse move-
ment is still emphasized, albeit in aspirational terms.54 At least 
as a normative proposition, inclusiveness is central to 
SlutWalk.55
So, too, is solidarity. This theme is expressed in the com-
ments of a skeptic who observes, “[E]very feminist I’ve talked 
with about this sees the potential for good in SlutWalk, hence 
our cautious optimism, hesitant solidarity (but solidarity none-
theless), and our willingness to spend our time offering our cri-
tiques.”
  
56
Even if my feminism looks different than yours, can we be unexpected 
friends, comrades and allies? SlutWalks seem to offer a loud ‘yes,’ and 
if people such as myself, with a gaze tempered by suspicion or even 
outright disgust, choose to attend, listen and learn, we might be 
moved by the magical synergy of SlutWalks.
 Another participant, noting the “collective resistance” 
that characterizes SlutWalks, suggests,  
57
A SlutWalk event is widely viewed as a “march of solidarity.”
  
58
The idea of group cohesion is integral to SlutWalk’s, at 
times self-conscious, efforts to revitalize feminism and its ap-
  
 
2011, 10:22 PM), http://queerdictionary.tumblr.com/post/9264228131/cisgender 
-adj. 
 52. Griffin, supra note 43. 
 53. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 54. For instance, Salamishah Tillet, a professor of English and Africana 
Studies at the University of Pennsylvania and popular feminist blogger, ad-
vises that, to become a lasting movement, SlutWalk must “integrate[], as its 
organizers and protesters, those women—lesbian, queer and transgendered; 
women of color, low-income women and sexually exploited workers—who are 
most vulnerable to sexual assault and more likely to be called ‘slut,’ regardless 
of what they’re wearing.” Tillet, supra note 43.  
 55. But see infra Part II.B.2.  
 56. I Saw the Sign But Did We Really Need a Sign?: SlutWalk and Rac-
ism, THE CRUNK FEMINIST COLLECTIVE (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter I Saw the 
Sign], http://crunkfeministcollective.wordpress.com/2011/10/06/i-saw-the-sign 
-but-did-we-really-need-a-sign-slutwalk-and-racism. 
 57. Griffin, supra note 43. 
 58. Molly Kirschner, A 17-Year-Old Does SlutWalk, MS. MAG. BLOG (Oct. 
4, 2011), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2011/10/04/a-17-year-old-does-slutwalk; 
see also Coco Papy, SlutWalk NYC, PERSEPHONE MAG. (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://persephonemagazine.com/2011/09/persephone-pioneers-slutwalk-nyc 
(“[R]ape culture isn’t going anywhere and we need marches for awareness and 
solidarity.”); Katha Pollitt, Talk the Talk, Walk the SlutWalk, THE NATION, 
July 18/25, 2011, at 9, 9 (“[SlutWalk is the] bold, original, do-it-yourself pro-
test movement we’ve been waiting for, a rock-hard wall of female solidarity—
an attack on one is an attack on all!”).  
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parent success in doing so. Observers and participants alike no-
tice this dynamic. For instance, in its annual selection of world 
visionaries, The Utne Reader chose the two Toronto women who 
first organized SlutWalk, noting that “[r]esponse to the move-
ment has indeed been huge . . . . invigorating feminism with 
new energy.”59 According to Jessica Valenti, among today’s 
most influential feminist bloggers,60 “SlutWalks have become 
the most successful feminist action of the past 20 years.”61 An 
organizer of SlutWalk New York City asserts that “[t]he 
‘slutwalks’ are only one manifestation of a new and young fem-
inist movement and that’s really important to keep in mind.”62 
Her co-organizer expresses a similar sentiment: “We [SlutWalk 
New York City organizers] hope that this is just the beginning 
of a re-invigorated feminist movement inclusive of the many in-
tersecting issues and identities present in feminism.”63 Partici-
pants frequently echo these insights when describing their ex-
periences of the rallies.64
SlutWalk has inspired a new generation of women to femi-
nist activism.
  
65
 
 59. Margret Aldrich, 25 Visionaries Who Are Changing Your World: 
Heather Jarvis and Sonya J.F. Barnett: Power Walkers, UTNE READER, Nov. 
2011, at 36, 42.  
 Yet with few exceptions, earlier generation fem-
 60. See About, JESSICA VALENTI, http://jessicavalenti.com/about (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2014). 
 61. Jessica Valenti, SlutWalks and the Future of Feminism, WASH. POST, 
June 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/slutwalks-and-the 
-future-of-feminism/2011/06/01/AGjB9LIH_story.html. 
 62. Papy, supra note 58. 
 63. Id. (quoting Nicole C. Kubon). 
 64. A participant in a SlutWalk stated: 
As I walked . . . I found myself thinking a powerful thought: THIS is 
what feminism can look like. To argue otherwise, I realized, is an at-
tempt to foreclose what feminism can be. To do so undermines not on-
ly the shift from feminism to feminisms, but also our feminist com-
mitments to self-definition, empowerment and agency. We must ask 
ourselves, Who am I to determine how someone else should embody a 
feminist stance of resistance?  
Griffin, supra note 43.  
 65. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 43 (wishing that more would attend 
SlutWalk and “witness what feminist activism can look like”); Nussbaum, su-
pra note 34, at 106 (“[E]ven the most rancorous threads strike me as inspiring, 
a sign of how alive the conversation is.”); Kristin Tillotson, “SlutWalk” March 
Divides Feminists, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Sept. 29, 2011, http://www 
.startribune.com/lifestyle/130720908.html (stating that SlutWalk has “struck 
an inspirational chord with many women, particularly Gen Xers and 
millenials”).  
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inists remain largely uninvolved in the initiative.66 One rather 
obvious explanation is that, through its “branding,”67 SlutWalk 
has alienated an older constituency. But, on closer examina-
tion, we may discern more substantive reasons for a genera-
tional divide. Although SlutWalk is in many ways consistent 
with familiar feminist tenets, the movement also differs in im-
portant ways from prior waves68
Heavy reliance on Internet technologies
 of feminism. 
69 and a revamped 
aesthetic70
 
 66. Cf. Pollitt, supra note 
 are components of this change. But two more sub-
stantive features distinguish SlutWalk from earlier feminisms: 
first, a surprisingly atheoretical stance; and, second, an almost 
exclusive focus on culture as opposed to law. I will illustrate 
each of these features in turn before developing the claim that 
there is a pronounced gap between contemporary feminist prac-
tice and the law.  
58, at 9 (“[M]ostly, feminists of all ages are 
cheering from the sidelines. . . . Further proof that the evergreen narrative 
about feminist generation wars tends to fade away whenever feminists actual-
ly get out and do something.”). 
 67. See infra note 155 (noting naming objections).  
 68. See Crawford, supra note 30, at 100–01 (“This self-proclaimed ‘third-
wave’ of feminists consists of women . . . too young to have taken part in the 
‘second wave’ of 1970s activism, let alone the ‘first wave’ of nineteenth-century 
advocacy for women’s rights.”).  
 69. As Bridget Crawford has observed, “Third-wave feminism’s interest in 
and reliance on the internet suggests a rich vehicle for international coalition-
building around women’s issues.” Id. at 166. SlutWalk’s trajectory testifies to 
this potential. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 34 (“Even as we march, it is be-
ing tweeted and filmed and Tumblr’d, a way of alerting the press and a way of 
bypassing the press.”); Tillet, supra note 43 (characterizing SlutWalk as “an 
anti-rape march and street protest that has gone viral”). In this context, it 
seems important to note the emergence of a significant digital divide. See Su-
san Crawford, The New Digital Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011. For further 
objections to SlutWalk as elitist, see infra text accompanying notes 206–07.  
 70. See Marcotte, supra note 43 (“The image of the pinch-mouthed femi-
nist scold telling the fun-loving boys to keep it down has quickly become a di-
nosaur, replaced now with the image of the knuckle-rapping church ladies tell-
ing third-wave feminists to roll up their stockings and tone down the dirty 
jokes on their ironically named blogs.”); Pollitt, supra note 58, at 44 (“The 
cheerful defiance, the in-your-faceness, the lack of hand-wringing and plead-
ing—when was the last time feminism was this much fun?”); see also Craw-
ford, supra note 30, at 118 (“Young women are reluctant to identify with the 
stereotype of the second-wave feminist, instead claiming to create ‘a joyful cul-
ture that makes being an adult woman who calls herself a feminist seem 
thrilling, sexy, and creative . . . .’”).  
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SlutWalk has deliberately forsaken feminist theory.71 De-
spite the fact that SlutWalk protests sexual violence and the 
culture that surrounds it,72 organizers and participants proceed 
without regard to established theoretical critiques of rape and 
rape culture.73 While promoting its anti-rape agenda, SlutWalk 
valorizes female sexuality74—here, too, without attending to 
any number of theories that might tend to enrich or complicate 
this account.75 Even if, as I will argue, existing legal frame-
works are wanting,76
 
 71. One of SlutWalk Baltimore’s organizers observes, “SlutWalk counts as 
the first event in years to energize the women’s rights movement. . . . [I]t is 
defiant and celebratory, and there are no feminist theory prerequisites to get 
involved.” Shawna Potter, Finding Solidarity Through SlutWalk, HOLLABACK! 
BALTIMORE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://bmore.ihollaback.org/2011/10/21/finding 
-solidarity-through-slutwalk/ (internal quotation marks omitted). In a similar 
vein, a SlutWalk Johannesburg participant approvingly suggests that “[t]he 
world’s most astonishingly successful rape-awareness campaign has owed 
nothing to the bastions of theory-driven radical feminism.” Snyckers, supra 
note 
 it is notable that SlutWalk eschews the 
very enterprise of theorizing without even purporting to ad-
vance an alternative.  
44.  
 72. See infra text accompanying notes 93–109.  
 73. One commentator expresses approval of another’s objection to 
SlutWalk as, in effect, a “post feminist event” because it “assumes there is no 
patriarchal context that slutwalk exists within.” Anita Sarkeesian, Link 
Round Up: Feminist Critiques of SlutWalk, FEMINIST FREQUENCY (May 16, 
2011), http://www.feministfrequency.com/2011/05/link-round-up-feminist 
-critiques-of-slutwalk/ (quoting Ada Farrugia Conroy, What Offends Me About 
SlutWalk, BROKEN ARTED (May 11, 2011), http://the-broken-arted.blogspot 
.com/2011/05/what-offends-me-about-slutwalk.html). Another critic charges 
that SlutWalk endeavors to “decontextualize patriarchy to a super libertarian 
wet dream of personal preference.” Four Brief Critiques of SlutWalk’s White-
ness, Privilege and Unexamined Power Dynamics, PEOPLE COLOR ORGANIZE 
[Hereinafter Four Brief Critiques of SlutWalk’s Whiteness] (May 16, 2011), 
http://www.peopleofcolor.tumblr.com/post/5542491947/four-brief-critiques-of 
-slutwalks-whiteness-privilege. Among participants, however, abstracting vio-
lence from patriarchy is the rule, with few exceptions (like a sign reading “I 
Will Be Post-Feminist When There Is a Post-Patriarchy”). jamilaleilani, 
SlutWalk NYC, MY F-ING LIFE (Oct. 3, 2011), http://myfinglife.wordpress 
.com/2011/10/03/slutwalk-nyc/ (internal quotation marks omitted); see infra 
Part II.B.3 (elaborating on the danger of decontextualization).  
 74. See infra text accompanying notes 110–15.  
 75. Given SlutWalk’s commitment to rape awareness, most striking is its 
failure even to consider how rape/rape culture might affect women’s sexuality. 
Catharine MacKinnon once declared, “We cannot think about sexuality and 
desire without considering the normalization of rape . . . .” CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW 46, 61 (1987). Whether or not one ultimately accepts this propo-
sition, it stands to be reckoned with. See infra Part II.B. 
 76. See infra text accompanying notes 228–37.  
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As it ignores theory, SlutWalk also overlooks the law. Giv-
en the initiative’s origins,77 its explicit focus on rape culture, in-
cluding the culture of victim blaming,78 may be unsurprising.79 
But, as we will see shortly, the movement is propelled by an 
underlying commitment to end rape.80 Given this aim, a cri-
tique of culture alone is inadequate,81 for it obscures how the 
criminal law itself functions to mediate and amplify the influ-
ence of culture on non-stranger rape.82
My intent is to highlight one little seen aspect of this dy-
namic by exploring the legal construction of female sexuality 
through rape law.
 
83
 
 77. See supra note 
 I will soon show how this construction is in-
24–25 and accompanying text.  
 78. See Tillotson, supra note 65 (“[W]omen in various states of dress or 
undress take to city streets to protest an attitude that holds victims responsi-
ble for inviting sexual violence.”); Papy, supra note 58 (“I don’t think the 
marches will ever be finished. . . . [R]ape culture isn’t going anywhere and we 
need marches for awareness and solidarity.” (quoting SlutWalk NYC organizer 
Melissa K. Marturano)).  
 79. It is also consistent with third-wave feminism generally. See Craw-
ford, supra note 30, at 102–03 (“Third-wave feminist writers focus on social 
change, not on legal issues, strategies or theories.”).  
 80. One of SlutWalk’s organizers emphasizes that ending sexual violence 
is the movement’s “higher purpose.” Papy, supra note 58 (quoting Nicole C. 
Kubon). The SlutWalk Toronto web site articulates the movement’s mission as 
follows: 
We are tired of being oppressed by slut-shaming; of being judged by 
our sexuality and feeling unsafe as a result. Being in charge of our 
sexual lives should not mean that we are opening ourselves to an ex-
pectation of violence, regardless if we participate in sex for pleasure 
or work. No one should equate enjoying sex with attracting sexual as-
sault . . . . Join us in our mission to spread the word that those who 
experience sexual assault are not the ones at fault, without exception. 
Why?, supra note 24.  
 81. I do not discount the possibility that SlutWalk’s focus on culture (and 
its corresponding overlook of legal theory and substantive law) has enhanced 
the size and force of its coalition. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735–36 (1994) (“Participants in legal 
controversies try to produce incompletely theorized agreements on particular 
outcomes. They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or low-level ex-
planations for it.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 82. Only occasionally is “the system” mentioned. See, e.g., Kirschner, su-
pra note 58 (reporting rally chants of “Blame the system not the victim!” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). To the extent the criminal justice system is 
criticized, critique is leveled at individual actors (primarily police officers), ra-
ther than rape law itself. See, e.g., id. (describing participants’ rallying cry of 
“NYPD [New York Police Department], rape is a felony!” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 83. A good deal of literature documents the criminal justice system’s poor 
performance in non-stranger rape cases, focusing largely on the decision mak-
ing of police, prosecutors, and jurors. See supra notes 4, 13. The role of rape 
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imical to sexual agency, undermining both anti-rape and pro-
sex norms.84
II.  “LOVE SEX, HATE RAPE”
 But before turning to the law, I will elaborate on 
the substantive claims of SlutWalk in order to begin the work 
of theorizing sexual agency.  
85
This Part begins by examining the dominant tropes of con-
temporary feminist practice as evinced by SlutWalk.
   
86 The first 
of these I refer to as anti-rape, and the second as pro-sex. After 
summarizing each strand separately, I consider the tensions 
that result when they are integrated.87 I identify three main ar-
eas of concern:88 objectification,89 sexualization,90 and 
decontextualization.91 With these dilemmas in mind, I suggest 
that sexual agency must be newly conceived.92
A. SEX WITHOUT RAPE 
  
SlutWalk is premised on the ubiquity of rape, most of it in-
flicted by acquaintances, dates, and intimates.93 In the words of 
one participant, “Let’s acknowledge that sexual violence exists 
everywhere.”94
 
law in constructing female sexuality—and its influence on the criminalization 
of non-stranger rape—has received far less attention.  
 Another explains that she is walking “because 
this kind of thing has happened to about half of the women I 
 84. See infra text accompanying notes 238–42.  
 85. At SlutWalk Vienna, a sign read “Love Sex Hate Rape.” The photo-
graph can be found at Gerald Henzinger, SlutWalk Vienna 2011, ENLUMEN 
(Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.enlumenblog.net/slutwalk-vienna-2011 (click the 
right arrow overlaying the pictures; picture is marked 7/20 on the bottom). In 
Wales, protestors chanted, “[T]wo, four, six, eight, love sex, hate rape.” Rachel 
Conner, Slutwalkers Take to Cardiff Streets, PRACTICAL FEMINISM (June 4, 
2011), http://practicalfeminism.wordpress.com/tag/rape (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 86. See infra Part II.A. 
 87. See infra Part II.B. 
 88. These areas may well overlap, but it is nevertheless fruitful to dis-
aggregate them for analysis.  
 89. See infra Part II.B.1.  
 90. See infra Part II.B.2.  
 91. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 92. See infra Part II.C. 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4 (discussing the prevalence of 
non-stranger rape). 
 94. Maggie Cohen, SlutWalk and the Legacy of White Feminism, WHERE 
IS YOUR LINE? (Nov. 7, 2011), http://whereisyourline.org/2011/11/slutwalk-and 
-the-legacy-of-white-feminism. 
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know.”95 Yet another, notes that “it happens everywhere.”96 And 
a high school student says that she was at the rally, “not only 
to speak out for her friends and family that had been victimized 
[including her mother, who was raped the night of Homecom-
ing,] but also to say she didn’t want it to happen to her little 
sisters, too.”97 Participants find the status quo unacceptable.98 
Often angry99 and defiant,100 they decry rape101 and the culture 
of victim-blaming that surrounds it.102 Some wear the clothes 
they had on when raped.103
 
 95. Peck, supra note 
  
49.  
 96. Phoebe Barghouty, SlutWalk Participants Emphasize Importance of 
Consent, MICH. DAILY, Oct. 23, 2011, http://www.michigandaily.com/news/ 
slutwalk-emphasizes-importance-consent (quoting an Ann Arbor resident) (in-
ternal quotation mark omitted).  
 97. Slut Walk Promotes Right to Bare Legs, DE ARCHIVES (Oct. 2, 2011, 
7:50 PM), http://archives.dailyegyptian.com/siu-2011/2011/10/2/slut-walk 
-promotes-right-to-bare-legs.html.  
 98. See Griffin, supra note 43 (describing a sign taped to a baby girl’s 
stroller that read, “I Deserve to Grow Up in a World without Rape”); Peck, su-
pra note 49 (“A protest might not change things overnight, but it’s important 
to send a message that the status quo is unacceptable.”).  
 99. “[Women’s] faces were filled with anger as they recalled a wealth of 
personal memories that have moved them to action.” Adam Polaski, SlutWalk 
Ithaca: Reclaiming Our Bodies, BUZZSAW, Nov. 2011, at 5, available at 
http://www.buzzsawmag.org/2011/11/09/reclaiming-our-bodies (The Body Is-
sue); see also supra note 70 (reporting “cheerful” rally atmosphere); cf. Griffin, 
supra note 43 (reporting on “sassy yet simple ‘Fuck Rape’ [sign] in sparkly 
blue glitter”).  
 100. See Kirschner, supra note 58 (recounting rally cry of “When women’s 
rights are under attack, what do we do? Stand up fight back!”); Amanda 
Marcotte, Six Reasons Why SlutWalk Is Awesome, RH REALITY CHECK (Oct. 2, 
2011, 9:01 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2011/10/02/slutwalk-just 
-awesome (describing a chant of “Rapists, go f—yourselves!”). 
 101. “‘My body is not a cocktail party,’ says one poet through the micro-
phone . . . .” Kirschner, supra note 58; see also supra text accompanying note 
80 (discussing SlutWalk’s purpose of ending violence). 
 102. See Marcotte, supra note 100 (“We are all affected by rape culture. The 
march featured people of different races, ages, backgrounds, sexual orienta-
tions, and gender identities, but all of us had felt the sting of victim-blaming 
for sexual violence.”); Why?, supra note 24 (declaring SlutWalk Toronto’s mis-
sion statement).  
 103. See Kirschner, supra note 58 (remarking on a “conservatively dressed 
girl holding a sign reading ‘This Is the Outfit I Was Raped In’”); Tillet, supra 
note 43 (“[At the DC march,] the women who stood out the most were rape 
survivors wearing the clothes they had been assaulted in—from pajamas to 
thigh-high boots—carrying signs that said, ‘This Is What I Was Wearing When 
I Was Raped.’”); see also Peck, supra note 49 (“I’m going to wear the plain 
brown dress I was wearing one night a few years ago when I was almost defi-
nitely sexually assaulted. I say ‘almost definitely’ because I can’t remember 
what happened, but basically, I know that sex was had, and that I didn’t re-
  
2014] SLUTWALKING 1471 
 
In placing sexual violation at the top of its agenda, 
SlutWalk replicates earlier feminist activism.104 But in empha-
sis, there is an important difference.105 SlutWalk implicitly 
challenges the stranger-rape paradigm. It is not “The Night” 
being reclaimed this time around106 but sexuality.107 Sexual vio-
lence is no longer primarily located in a dark alley. Instead, it 
is seen as occurring in the very same places where sex between 
intimates and acquaintances takes place.108
Just as sexual violation occurs in the setting of relation-
ships
  
109
 
member it, and that I was probably passed out (or at best, incredibly groggy) 
at the time.”).  
 so, too, does wanted sex. This brings us to SlutWalk’s 
more radical departure from prior feminist efforts—its deliber-
ate embrace of female sexuality in service of an anti-rape agen-
 104. Though SlutWalk disclaims reliance on theory, the centrality of sexual 
violation (with which the movement is primarily concerned) is also a hallmark 
of radical feminism. In Catharine MacKinnon’s influential words, “Sexuality is 
to feminism what work is to Marxism: that which is most one’s own, yet most 
taken away.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 515 (1982); see also Robin West, 
Law’s Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 395 (2005) (suggesting that this 
statement “might be the most important single utterance of twentieth-century 
radical political thought”). Notwithstanding this convergence, SlutWalk’s pro-
sex agenda sharply contrasts with the account of sexuality offered by radical 
feminists. See infra text accompanying note 164 (discussing radical feminism’s 
view of sexuality).  
 105. Susan Estrich, among a small group of legal scholars, has been at-
tending to non-stranger rape for decades. See Estrich, supra note 4, at 1161–
69, 1171–72 (discussing, in 1986, the legal issues of non-stranger rape). Even 
so, what we see today in terms of prioritization for feminist activism is differ-
ent.  
 106. See supra text accompanying note 43 (comparing SlutWalk to Take 
Back the Night rallies). 
 107. Cf. I Saw the Sign, supra note 56 (“It’s inspiring to see women coming 
together to protest the all-too-real threat and reality of rape and to reclaim our 
right to define and exercise our respective sexualities outside the context of 
patriarchy.”).  
 108. Cf. The Advocates for Human Rights, Date and Acquaintance Sexual 
Assault, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.stopvaw.org/date_and_ 
acquaintance_sexual_assault (last updated Feb. 22, 2012) (discussing the defi-
nitions and respective prevalence of acquaintance, date, and party rape). The-
se are places where consensual sex may also occur. See discussion infra note 
109 and accompanying text (elaborating on relationships and consensual sex). 
 109. I am using the word “relationship” loosely here, to encompass any as-
sociation with someone who is known: intimately, hardly, or somewhere be-
tween. In this general sense, it is within relationships that consensual sex 
may also occur. According to the dictates of SlutWalk, this consensual sex is to 
be fully celebrated. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.   
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da.110 Sexual desire, possible and realized, is central.111 Women 
chant, “[Y]es means yes,”112 and extol the virtues of liberated 
sex.113 As one participant remarks, “I wanted to be confronta-
tional and unapologetic for owning my sexuality.”114
 
 110. Katha Pollitt remarks that these women, even beyond delivering an 
anti-rape message, “are making a radical challenge to foundational ideas 
about women’s sexuality—and men’s.” Pollitt, supra note 
 This ven-
58, at 9; see also 
Nona Willis Aronowitz, A Tale of Two Protests: Why SlutWalk Works Better 
than Occupy Wall Street, GOOD (Sept. 30, 2011, 2:30 AM), http://www.good.is/ 
post/a-tale-of-two-protests-why-slutwalk-works-better-than-occupy-wall-street 
(“SlutWalk gets down to business while advocating pleasure.”).  
 111. This strand of SlutWalk sounds loudly in sex positive feminism. See 
Noor Al-Sibai, We Need Positive Feminists—Sex Positive Feminists, That Is, 
FEMINSPIRE (July 3, 2013), http://feminspire.com/we-need-positive-feminists 
-sex-positive-feminists-that-is/ (noting that the “SlutWalk movement of 2011” 
was the “coming out celebration” for sex positive feminism). As Rosalind Dixon 
helpfully summarizes the theory:  
Sex-positive feminists challenge the premises of dominance feminism. 
They argue that while sex might in some cases be a source of danger 
for women, it is also a potentially important site of pleasure, fulfill-
ment, and even power. In this sense, they share the approach of other 
“partial agency” feminist theorists, who emphasize the possibilities 
for, rather than simply constraints on, female agency. A key source of 
injustice, for sex-positive feminists, is the way in which women’s sex-
ual agency is limited by prevailing ideologies, particularly 
“repronormative” ideologies, i.e., those that valorize reproduction over 
other socially productive activities and casts non-reproductive sex for 
women as dangerous and illegitimate. 
Rosalind Dixon, Note, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 282 (2008) (footnotes omitted). It is interesting that 
SlutWalk, the most significant sex positive feminist initiative to date, comes in 
service of rape protest.  
 112. See, e.g., Karis Hanson, SlutWalk: Whatever We Wear, Wherever We 
Go, Yes Means Yes and No Means No!, F WORD (Sept. 25, 2012, 4:24 PM), 
http://www.thefword.org.uk/blog/2012/09/slutwalk_london_2.  
 113. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 94 (“I quickly embraced the goals of 
SlutWalk. I have a right to my sexuality, and I am exhausted from trying to 
dispel myths that women in touch with their sexuality deserve violence.”); 
Amanda Marcotte, Defending SlutWalk, SLATE (May 13, 2011), http:// 
www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2011/05/13/feminist_infighting_over_slutwalk_
commence.html (“When it comes to sex, women are as dirty as the next man, 
but they don’t have the same right to act out their fantasies. If they’re to be 
liberated, women have to demand the right to be dirty.” (quoting Australian 
feminist Germaine Greer) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Papy, supra 
note 58 (“[T]he point is extending basic sexual liberty to women benefits the 
health of the nation! Happier partners, healthier children, more wholly free 
and competent selves!” (quoting SlutWalk NYC co-organizer Rebecca Kathe-
rine Hirsch)). 
 114. Papy, supra note 58 (quoting SlutWalk NYC co-organizer Melissa K. 
Marturano).  
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eration of sex is not coincidental. Rather, it is intricately con-
nected to rape protest as an animating feature of SlutWalk.115
On first glance, the picture that emerges from SlutWalk’s 
anti-rape, pro-sex initiative might seem paradoxical.
 
116 How can 
so many women be victimized by sexual violence and still glori-
fy sex? As a related matter, why has a globalized exaltation of 
female sexuality been integral to a frontal attack on rape? An-
swering these questions requires reconciling SlutWalk’s anti-
rape and pro-sex motifs. We will see that this inquiry ultimate-
ly surfaces the primacy of sexual consent and the agency it is 
thought to represent.117
Let us begin by considering that SlutWalk seeks to contest 
cultural formulations of “bad victims,” women unworthy of pro-
tection from sexual violence.
  
118 The movement proceeds from 
the proposition that the dominant culture excuses rape when it 
is inflicted on women deemed too sexual.119
Explanations of SlutWalk’s agenda often encompass this 
rationale. According to one participant, the protest challenges 
the belief “that women who act in pleasure-seeking ways are 
transgressive and that crimes against them aren’t so bad.”
 Accordingly, “re-
claiming” female sexuality—or altering its normative signifi-
cance—becomes a way of subverting the very notion of “bad vic-
timhood.”  
120
 
 115. See Caitlin Flanagan, The Trouble with SlutWalks: They Trivialize 
Rape, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 4, 2011, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/trouble/ 
slutwalks-trivialize-rape-article-1.944247 (“SlutWalks are dedicated to an au-
dacious proposition: that the erotic desires of sexually adventurous women can 
be celebrated at the same time and during the very same event, that they de-
mand improved protection from rape.”); Marcotte, supra note 
 
100 (“SlutWalk 
uses an anti-rape message to sell sex positivity as much as anything else.”); 
Papy, supra note 58 (quoting SlutWalk NYC co-organizer Rebecca Katherine 
Hirsch as stating, “A SlutWalk goal of mine is to normalize and broaden our 
conceptions of female sexuality, male sexuality, trans sexuality, etc. in all 
their diversity and potentiality, and to not reflexively vilify sex as ‘evil’ or re-
duce it to the most petrified, uptight, TAUGHT (as opposed to natural) ‘male’ 
standard of attack-penetrate-flee”).  
 116. Because each of the theories most relevant to the anti-rape and pro-
sex strands individually falls short of providing an adequate account of the 
other, it is fair to say that this apparent paradox is undertheorized.  
 117. See infra Part II.B.  
 118. See Estrich, supra note 4, at 1088 (“I learned, much later, that I had 
‘really’ been raped. Unlike, say, the woman who claimed she’d been raped by a 
man she actually knew, and was with voluntarily. Unlike, say, women who are 
‘asking for it’ and get what they deserve.”). 
 119. See supra text accompanying note 10 (elaborating on rape culture).  
 120. Marcotte, supra note 113; see also Marcotte, supra note 100 (“For 
many people, female sexuality is threatening and they respond with violence. 
  
1474 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1453 
 
One of SlutWalk New York City’s organizers observes that 
“‘[r]ape culture’ exists because women are culturally instructed 
to be viewed as objects, not agents with exciting, beneficial sex-
ual things to . . . share. . . .”121 A commentator suggests that 
SlutWalk is “attacking the very division of women into good 
girls and bad ones, madonnas and whores.”122
At the same time, women are using the occasion of a rape 
protest to affirm the fundamental importance of sexuality.
 By centering fe-
male sexuality, SlutWalk seeks to explode a dichotomy that 
perpetuates (selective) victim blaming.  
123 
The harm of rape is real;124 indeed the omnipresent threat of 
rape is itself oppressive.125 As evinced by the Toronto police of-
ficer’s now-infamous advice,126 women the world over are pres-
sured to conform their sexual behavior to benchmarks of ac-
ceptability in order to mitigate this threat. SlutWalk’s 
celebration of sexuality is powerful testament to a collective 
will to resist these pressures.127
 
And we, the SlutWalkers and SlutWalk allies, are standing up to say, 
‘Enough.’”). 
  
 121. Papy, supra note 58 (quoting SlutWalk NYC co-organizer Rebecca 
Katherine Hirsch). 
 122. Pollitt, supra note 58, at 9; see also Flanagan, supra note 115 (calling 
SlutWalk “a kind of Stonewall for lusty women, a loud, angry cry to live freely 
and be treated the same as sexually conventional women”).  
 123. Cf. Crawford, supra note 30, at 122 (“Third wave feminism celebrates 
the centrality of sexual pleasure and the woman who knows how to achieve 
it.”).  
 124. See Kenyon Farrow, My Remarks for SlutWalk NYC, KENYON FAR-
ROW (Oct. 2, 2011), http://kenyonfarrow.com/2011/10/02/my-remarks-for 
-slutwalk-nyc/ (“I hope that we are able to own the real legacies of trauma 
many of us face in terms of the ways in which we are sexualized and criminal-
ized in communities and by the state, to say nothing of the acts of violence 
that have been committed against us.”).  
 125. See Marcotte, supra note 100 (“SlutWalk gets your buy-in with the an-
ti-rape message, and then sells you on the idea that rape is more than a crime 
against a single woman but part of a larger system that robs women of our 
freedom, our pleasure, and our right to live as we see fit.”). Some participants 
explicitly draw a connection between rape and other forms of sexual subordi-
nation. See, e.g., Papy, supra note 58 (“[W]e’re feminists, and we dare to ironi-
cally, though seriously, call out bullshit on rape culture and repressive stand-
ards of sexuality.” (quoting SlutWalk NYC organizer Melissa K. Marturano)).  
 126. See supra text accompanying note 25.  
 127. See, e.g., Snyckers, supra note 44 (“[SlutWalk] is about a woman’s 
right to wear WHATEVER she chooses, and to express her sexuality HOW-
EVER she chooses, without fear of oppression.”); Tillet, supra note 43 (“For 
me, walking alongside women who confidently wore the clothing in which they 
had been sexually assaulted was exciting and empowering. As a black woman 
and a rape survivor, it was one of the only times in my life that I felt like I 
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Condemning sexual violence becomes an opportunity for 
proclaiming that sexual desire exists,128 and it is valued,129 even 
in a world of widespread sexual violation. While acknowledging 
the backdrop of rape,130 women are asserting, often explicitly,131 
a sexuality of their own.132
“We want sex! Not assault!”
  
133 The protesters’ simple de-
mand captures the essence of SlutWalk, which defies neat 
characterization as pro-sex or anti-rape, because it is both.134 
For the women participating, the distinguishing feature of sex 
(which, again, women “want”) is the presence of mutual con-
sent.135 No particular type of sex is promoted over any other.136 
And while desire is a recurring theme,137
SlutWalk New York City’s mission statement reflects this 
orientation: “No matter who you are. No matter where you 
work. No matter how you identify. No matter how you flirt. No 
matter what you wear. No matter whom you choose to love. No 
 it is consent that 
emerges as SlutWalk’s touchstone.  
 
could wear whatever I wanted, wherever I wanted, without the threat of 
rape.”); Why?, supra note 24 (“No one should equate enjoying sex with attract-
ing sexual assault.”).  
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 110–15. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 93–109 (discussing SlutWalk’s an-
ti-rape agenda). 
 131. See, e.g., Papy, supra note 58 (“I wanted to be confrontational and un-
apologetic for owning my sexuality . . . .” (quoting SlutWalk NYC organizer 
Melissa K. Marturano)).  
 132. Women and men participating in SlutWalks have made similar obser-
vations. See Farrow, supra note 124. Farrow concludes the passage by assert-
ing that pervasive sexual violence “does not negate nor render impossible the 
many of us who, despite those legacies [of trauma], own our overt sexuality or 
promiscuity, and see it as a liberatory process.” Id.; see also Polaski, supra 
note 99, at 5 (reporting remarks of a college senior who was raped by her boy-
friend as a teenager, urging women to “‘reclaim’ their bodies and to declare 
that they are allowed to experience pleasure”). For a discussion of challenges 
to these ideas, see infra Part II.B.1.  
 133. Polaski, supra note 99, at 5 (internal quotation mark omitted) (de-
scribing chant at Ithaca protest).  
 134. As we will soon see, “sex, not assault” explains the emergence of con-
sent as the movement’s unifying principle. See infra notes 138–56 and accom-
panying text.  
 135. See infra notes 138–44 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Farrow, supra note 124 (discussing how the purpose of SlutWalk 
extends to gay, straight, bisexual, and queer men); Papy, supra note 58 
(“Straight sex is not more special than queer sex.” (quoting SlutWalk NYC or-
ganizer Rebecca Katherine Hirsch)). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 110–15 (discussing SlutWalk’s 
embrace of female sexuality). 
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matter what you said before: NO ONE has the right to touch 
you without your consent.”138 At rallies around the country, 
signs and shirts express a similar orientation: “Got Con-
sent?”;139 “A short skirt is not an invitation”;140 “My Dress is not 
a Yes”;141 “Whether scantily dressed or fully dressed, clothing 
does not equal consent”;142 and “Sex Is Something You Do To-
gether, Not Something You Do To Someone Else.”143 When re-
flecting on SlutWalk’s purpose, participants often cite the de-
sideratum of consent.144
But the meaning of consent is thinly sketched. The mini-
mal definition that has evolved derives mostly from elaboration 
on what consent is not.
  
145 Nonetheless, we may surmise a num-
ber of features of the consent construct advanced by 
SlutWalk.146 Consent is affirmative: “Consent is a clear and 
freely given ‘yes,’ not the absence of a ‘no . . . .’”147 Moreover, be-
cause women are sexual beings,148 their consent expresses not 
simply acquiescence149 but desire itself.150 As one rally sign pro-
claims, “Consent is Sexy.”151
 
 138. Papy, supra note 
  
58. 
 139. Tillet, supra note 43. 
 140. Barghouty, supra note 96. 
 141. Griffin, supra note 43. 
 142. Harsha Walia, Slutwalk—to March or Not to March, FEMINISTING 
(May 18, 2011), http://feministing.com/2011/05/18/slutwalk-to-march-or-not-to 
-march/. 
 143. jamilaleilani, supra note 73.  
 144. See, e.g., Barghouty, supra note 96 (“[T]he walk drew important atten-
tion to the issue of consent.”); Farrow, supra note 124 (“Being slutty and pro-
miscuous is not incongruent with dignity, self-esteem or consent!”); hanalei, 
Critique of SlutWalk on Behalf of All Women of Color Communities, 
FEMINISTING (Sept. 26, 2011), http://community.feministing.com/2011/09/26/ 
critique-of-slutwalk-on-behalf-of-all-women-of-color-communities/ (“I under-
stand that this is about consent.”); Walia, supra note 142 (“I marched to mark 
the unceded territory of women’s bodies. . . . Most heartening was the signifi-
cant number of teenagers, who are perhaps most pressured against affirming 
consent . . . .”).  
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 137–44 (discussing SlutWalk’s 
stance against non-consensual sex). 
 146. These are based on expressions of what constitutes consent’s absence, 
as well as on the movement’s foregrounding of female sexual desire.  
 147. Barghouty, supra note 96 (quoting SlutWalk participant Jenny Han-
sen). 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 110–15 (discussing the centrality 
of women’s sexuality to the movement). 
 149. How frequently this is actually the case is a difficult question, about 
which I will have more to say later. See infra Part II.B.3.   
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As a pivot point for the sex/rape distinction,152 the idea of 
consent—and the woman who gives or withholds it—is founda-
tional to SlutWalk.153 By demanding sex without rape and in-
sisting that consent distinguishes the two, women are in effect 
declaring their sexual agency.154 Because sexual agency unifies 
SlutWalk’s dual mission,155
 
 150. Cf. Peck, supra note 
 the concept has been given new 
47 (“A lot of the SlutWalk’s message is that you 
should do (or not do) sexual things because they make you happy, and not be-
cause someone else is pressuring you to do (or not do) them.”).  
 151. Polaski, supra note 99, at 5 (describing Ithaca rally).  
 152. While this distinction makes good sense in some contexts—primarily, 
the criminal justice arena—it may well be overly simplistic, as a general prop-
osition, to “love sex” (while “hating rape”). See supra text accompanying note 
85. I elaborate on this idea in later discussion. See infra Part II.B.3.  
 153. By contrast, the law in most jurisdictions does not make consent dis-
positive when marking the border between sex and rape. See infra notes 243–
44 and accompanying text.  
 154. This assertion is largely channeled into talk of consent. One rare ex-
ception is the comment by a self-described sex worker who explains that 
“SlutWalk is about my choices, however complex they may be, feeling good 
about my agency, and insisting that I deserve to be safe.” Trisha Low, On 
SlutWalk NYC, Occupy Wall Street, and Why on Saturday, My Sex Work Has 
Nothing to Do with Your Capitalism, WHERE IS YOUR LINE? (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://whereisyourline.org/2011/09/on-slutwalk-nyc-occupy-wall-street-and 
-why-on-saturday-my-sex-work-has-nothing-to-do-with-your-capitalism/. For 
concerns about decontextualizing agency, see infra Part II.B.3. 
 155. Because I am most interested in problems of agency raised by 
SlutWalk, I do not focus on concerns about the name, except insofar as they 
expose problems of essentialism. It should be noted, however, that the name 
itself has provoked much, if not most, of the popular criticism. See, e.g., Keli 
Goff, Dear Feminists, Will You Also Be Marching in N***erwalk? Because I 
Won’t., HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2011, 8:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/keli-goff/slutwalk-new-york_b_993261.html (“You can’t ‘reclaim’ a word 
defined by a predominant group in power unless you are a part of that 
group.”); Sarkeesian, supra note 73 (“While the organizers of the SlutWalk 
might think that proudly calling themselves ‘sluts’ is a way to empower wom-
en, they are in fact making life harder for girls who are trying to navigate 
their way through the tricky terrain of adolescence.” (quoting Gail Dines & 
Wendy J. Murphy, SlutWalk Is Not Sexual Liberation, GUARDIAN (May 8, 
2011, 1:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may08/ 
slutwalk-is-not-sexual-liberation)); see also Allie Grasgreen, “SlutWalks” At-
tract Attention, Controversy Internationally, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2011, http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/story/2011-10-05/slutwalk/ 
50670972/1 (“Chief among the criticisms [of SlutWalk] is the event’s title 
. . . .”). While the linguistic implications of “slut” and the relative merits of rec-
lamation remain outside the scope of further discussion, the underlying con-
ceptual issues implicated by the term will be addressed shortly. See infra Part 
II.B.  
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stature. This may ultimately prove to be the movement’s en-
during contribution to legal theory.156
The next section examines the implications of this turn by 
describing the female sexual subject constructed by an anti-
rape, pro-sex agenda. To do so, I first explore the dilemmas that 
inhere in sexual agency.
  
157 I then propose a conceptual frame-
work that accommodates these tensions,158
B. SEXUAL AGENCY QUANDARIES 
 thereby enabling a 
deeper understanding of what sexual agency entails.  
The new normative significance afforded sexual agency 
provides strong impetus to elaborate on its meaning. Sexual 
agency is not simply derived from a pro-sex orientation, as a 
simplistic account of SlutWalk might suggest. Rather, core ten-
sions inhere in the concept of agency that threaten to under-
mine it, particularly if these tensions are overlooked. I identify 
these tensions as objectification, sexualization, and 
decontexualization.159
1.  Objectification 
  
SlutWalk presumes that women’s sexuality is their own, 
and their desires therefore are to be celebrated.160 But there is 
reason to be skeptical of this premise. Particularly at its most 
performative,161
 
 156. In turn, legal theory requires some reworking to accommodate in-
sights into sexual agency that have emerged from practice. See infra Part II.C.  
 the movement presents the possibility that 
 157. These dilemmas are starkly presented by SlutWalk but are by no 
means confined to it. For an agentic view of female sexuality to positively in-
fluence theory and practice, these tensions must be confronted.  
 158. See infra Part II.C. 
 159. See supra text accompanying note 88 (noting potential for overlap be-
tween the three areas).  
 160. See, e.g., Papy, supra note 58 (“I justified using the name [SlutWalk] 
because I wanted to ridicule it, I wanted to suck the venom out of it, I wanted 
to be confrontational and unapologetic for owning my own sexuality . . . .” 
(quoting SlutWalk NYC co-organizer Melissa K. Marturano)).  
 161. For instance, pole dancing comes to mind. See Grasgreen, supra note 
155 (“[A]t SlutWalk NYC one weekend, one woman pole-danced while male 
onlookers filmed the scene with their phones.”). The question of performance is 
also raised by women’s dress at the rallies, which have been described by com-
peting accounts. Compare, e.g., Goff, supra note 155 (“Fair or not, the images 
from SlutWalk send the message that when push comes to shove, young wom-
en will always fall back on taking off their clothes to get attention, even when 
it comes to making a serious political statement.”), and Griffin, supra note 43 
(“[T]here was a cascade of short skirts, lace tights, knee high black boots and 
the color red.”), with Aronowitz, supra note 110 (“The protest has been criti-
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women’s sexual conduct (and even preferences)162 are contorted 
by patriarchal structures.163
This prospect finds abundant support in a long tradition of 
radical feminist critique of women’s sexuality as inseparable 
from women’s oppression.
 
164 From this vantage, women’s claims 
of sexual subjectivity are simply false. Because men have the 
power to violate and objectify women, men define the meaning 
of female sexuality (to their own advantage), irrespective of 
whether women recognize this reality. The very notion of sub-
jectivity is therefore misguided. As Catherine MacKinnon once 
remarked, “All women live in sexual objectification the way fish 
live in water.”165
Critics of SlutWalk voice related objectification concerns,
 
166 
which are acknowledged even by movement supporters.167
 
cized for pressuring women to wear Girls-Gone-Wild outfits, but the reality is 
that while some women stuff themselves into bustiers and stilettos, others 
rock sweatpants. Most wear something in between.”).  
 As 
 162. Robin West helpfully distinguishes between preferences and conduct. 
West, supra note 104, at 388 (“What we should doubt . . . are not women’s sex-
ual desires but rather women’s sexual choices, and particularly women’s choic-
es to engage in sex—of any description—that is not desired.”).  
 163. Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization 
of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1387 (1992) (“Doing and appreciat-
ing sexy dress is flawed as pleasure/resistance . . . . It is asymmetrical. The 
(straight white middle class) men (or man) watch and the woman performs. It 
seems plausible to me that this pattern reinforces, helps reproduce one of the 
bad aspects of patriarchy: its construction of woman as the object of the atten-
tive, adoring, excited male gaze, the actress active by being-for-the-men, while 
the men dispose of her fate, and the fate of the world, on the side.”).  
 164. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 111, at 282 (explaining that dominance 
feminism, as radical feminism is often called, posits that “female identity and 
the feminine as we know it are the pure products of a system of sexual subor-
dination in which men defined themselves as subjects, and women as objects”); 
West, supra note 104, at 399 (“Preference and choice are constructed hand-in-
hand with the individual: what the individual is—she, from whom sex is tak-
en—will dictate what the individual prefers—she prefers to give her sex, 
largely so as to avoid the threat to life entailed by its forceful, coerced expro-
priation.” (restating an argument by Catharine MacKinnon)).  
 165. MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 149. 
 166. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 115 (“Get a group of barely dressed 
women to shout about how horny they are, and men will reliably show up to 
cheer them on and get their digits.”); Rebecca Traister, Ladies, We Have a 
Problem, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 24, 2011, at 9–10 (“Scantily clad marching 
seems weirdly blind to the race, class and body-image issues that usually 
(rightly) obsess young feminists and seems inhospitable to the scads of women 
who, for various reasons, might not feel it logical or comfortable to express 
their revulsion at victim-blaming by donning bustiers.”); Miriam, supra note 
36 (“[I]f the choice of sexual self-presentation was such a free choice why does 
it seem to come in only one flavor, namely, some variant of the patriarchal 
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one women warns, “There are going to be a lot of men lined up 
to watch this—and they’re not going to be celebrating women’s 
rights.”168 But the movement itself stands in opposition to the 
idea of female sexuality as subordination. Put differently, the 
impossibility of sexual agency cannot be squared with 
SlutWalk—unless, as an epistemological matter, the collective 
consciousness it manifests is utterly disregarded.169
If this false consciousness approach is rejected as uncon-
vincing, unworkable, or both,
  
170
 
construct of ‘slut’? And why does corporate patriarchy have such a mammoth 
investment in this construct?”); Kirstin Powers, Slut Walks Don’t Help Women, 
DAILY BEAST (May 19, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/05/ 
19/slut-walks-are-organized-by-liberal-feminists-but-dont-help-women.html 
(“Feminists are supposed to be countercultural, yet by marching in fishnets 
and bras with the word ‘slut’ scrawled on their bodies, they are simply imitat-
ing a culture that objectifies and hypersexualizes women and girls on a scale 
never before seen in history . . . . Do [the walkers] really think that when men 
see scantily clad women holding signs saying ‘Slut Pride,’ the first thing they 
think of is women’s empowerment?”). For a somewhat more complicated ac-
count, see Griffin, supra note 
 SlutWalk must be accepted as a 
43 (“[M]any women . . . were unafraid to bare 
cellulite, stretch marks and tummy fat, all of which are typically outlawed by 
dominant size and beauty ideals. Baring the parts of themselves most vulner-
able to cruel public commentary, they sauntered and strutted with a tangible 
sense of body confidence . . . .”).  
 167. For instance, one participant poses the question, “How might the 
SlutWalk be reproducing oppression in this very moment?” Griffin, supra note 
43.   
 168. Tillotson, supra note 65 (quoting Kristine Holmgren, a feminist play-
wright). 
 169. See Crawford, supra note 30, at 166 (“[T]hird-wave feminists reject the 
suggestion that women act with a false consciousness. Third-wave feminism 
values an individual’s account of his or her own experience and trusts it as ac-
curate.” (footnote omitted)).  
 170. I am persuaded by this assessment:  
The pragmatist-feminist brackets the question of false consciousness. 
She sees that for women living in patriarchy, women’s experience of 
patriarchal life is partially self-constitutive. She forbears from de-
manding of women, of herself, the impossible: the self-destroying reg-
imen of constantly remarking, in one’s every moment of self-
fulfillment as woman, the mark, the trace, of deprivation of self. Not 
only do those moments of self-fulfillment, lived in patriarchy, partial-
ly constitute identity for women in patriarchy, they also constitute 
the beginning (not the end) of knowledge of a possible better world 
and determination to strive towards it. Conventional femininity is 
where we start, it is what we have to work with. No pragmatist would 
want women to detach thought and action from desire. No pragmatist 
would want to waste the concrete knowledge wrought by women liv-
ing, speaking, finding voices, under male domination. 
Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist 
Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1050–51 (1991). Robin West 
also warns about “the practical consequence . . . of putting into serious ques-
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rape protest rooted in the genuine valuation of female sexuali-
ty. The movement maintains that sex is not per se subordina-
tion, and agency is possible.171 Yet it also affirms that elements 
of the objectification critique are valid: sex can be subordinat-
ing, and agency is not always possible.172
Women seek to exercise a meaningful degree of sexual 
agency—and often achieve it, but not always. They certainly 
don’t exercise this when they are raped. Perhaps they exercise 
this when they pole dance in the streets, and perhaps not.
  
173 
When men line up to watch the march,174 their reasons for do-
ing so may matter, and they may not. All of this brings to mind 
a spectrum, rather than the complete presence or absence of 
women’s agency.175
A refurbished understanding of objectification accounts for 
the real possibility of female sexual subjectivity. It credits the 
validity of female sexual desire.
  
176
2. Sexualization 
 At the same time, it pro-
claims that, in a world of massive sexual violation, subjectivity 
and desire too often founder.  
Any effort to move female sexual agency to the fore raises 
the specter of sexualization, which occurs when an imposed 
level of hypersexuality subsumes other (i.e., non-sexual) as-
 
tion the authenticity or falsity of felt preferences and desires, rather than 
viewing those preferences and desires as the baseline of our evaluative prac-
tices . . . .” Robin West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 
1495 (1990).  
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 110–15.  
 172. Insofar as postmodern feminism is inclined to minimize the signifi-
cance of sexual violation, it fails to account for the primacy of SlutWalk’s anti-
rape commitments. Cf. West, supra note 104, at 427 (“[S]exuality per se should 
not be understood as (primarily) a site of political exploitation and violence. It 
should be understood, rather . . . as (primarily) a site of liberation and trans-
gression. Consequently, not only should women’s sexual choices be embraced 
. . . but sex should be more or less valorized, and women’s claims of sexual vic-
timization should be viewed skeptically.” (footnote omitted)) (summarizing 
views of postmodern critics); id. at 439–44 (critiquing these views).  
 173. Of course, I don’t pretend to know the answer.  
 174. See supra text accompanying note 155 (quoting Grasgreen).  
 175. See infra Part II.C.  
 176. West, supra note 104, at 38 (“We should at least be neutral—neither 
critical nor confident—regarding the degree to which our desires, if fulfilled, 
will give pleasure, and whether their satiation will serve our interests. What 
we should doubt . . . are not women’s sexual desires but rather women’s sexual 
choices, and particular women’s choices to engage in sex—of any description—
that is not desired.”). 
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pects of women’s identity. The danger is that women who ex-
plicitly embrace their sexuality will be defined primarily as 
sexual beings.177 This definition may even extend to women who 
do not explicitly embrace their sexuality.178
The harm of sexualization impacts women in many differ-
ent ways.
 SlutWalk’s pro-sex 
advocacy raises this dilemma. 
179
 
 177. Among others, Ruth Colker has questioned the extent to which sexual-
ity should be emphasized by feminists given that patriarchy has long defined 
women by their sexuality. She writes: 
 But Black women are particularly situated to suf-
fer from a discourse that promotes female sexuality as a uni-
An emphasis on sexuality within a woman’s life may be feminine but 
not feminist. Patriarchy has made sexuality a crucial component of 
women’s lives by making it central to women's oppression and subor-
dination. Because women have never had the freedom to experience 
their authentic sexuality, it is impossible to know whether expres-
sions of sexuality would be central to a woman’s free and authentic 
life. In a transformed society, the importance of sexuality in a wom-
an’s life might dissipate or disappear. In existing society, the energy 
that women expend on developing sexual connectedness, love, com-
passion, etc., may be evidence of their brokenness and subordination 
rather than their authenticity. 
Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry into the 
Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 217, 231 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
 178. See Nathaniel Berman, Roundtable Discussion: Subversive Legal Mo-
ments, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 211–12 (2003) (querying whether there is 
“too much sexuality in ‘Women and the Law’” due to the “improper eroticiza-
tion of women”); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out 
of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 868 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenbury & Roth-
man, Sex In and Out of Intimacy] (suggesting that “sex may currently play 
such an important role in some people’s lives because of the historic construc-
tion of sex by the state and other social forces,” and expressing hope that more 
sexual liberty will make sex a less exceptional activity).  
 179. As Dixon explains: 
In an intersectional feminist account, both sex and gender hierarchies 
circulate and intersect with other hierarchies in ways that make gen-
der injustice deeply contextual in nature. Both the sources and nature 
of gender injustice must therefore always be considered with close at-
tention to the way in which sex and gender intersect with race and 
class and other axes such as religion, age, disability, sexual orienta-
tion, and immigrant status. Intersectional feminists also argue that 
feminists should be extremely cautious about attempting to identify 
sources of commonality across women’s diverse experiences, under-
standing the act of foregrounding sex or gender as axes of subordina-
tion as exercising power that depends upon and reflects the race and 
class privilege of the speaker. Claims of commonality are treated as 
deeply suspect unless they arise from broadly mobilized forms of fem-
inist coalitional politics in which all women have the opportunity to 
speak for themselves in describing the nature of their experiences and 
making claims for redress. 
Dixon, supra note 111, at 283–84.  
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versal good.180 Images of the Jezebel have endured since slav-
ery,181 leaving Black women vulnerable to widespread sexual 
violence with little recourse.182 The idea of reclaiming sexuality 
thus has a different meaning in this context than it possesses 
for white women,183 whose past and present sexualization is not 
rooted in slavery.184
Many Black women have effectively asserted that their ex-
periences of sexualization contradict SlutWalk’s unstated as-
 
 
 180. There is a rich feminist literature to draw upon for understanding this 
phenomenon. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersec-
tion of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doc-
trine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; An-
gela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581 (1990). Martha Chamallas’s summary description is particularly use-
ful: 
The key insight of these theories [intersectional feminism, critical 
race feminism, or anti-essentialist feminism] is that gender hierar-
chies intersect and circulate with other social hierarchies such as 
race, class, age, sexual orientation, disability, and immigrant status. 
The “anti-essentialist” feature of these theories resists finding com-
monalities among all women, stressing that women are situated dif-
ferently and experience distinctive kinds of discrimination. It also 
recognizes that as women we are simultaneously privileged and sub-
ordinated along different dimensions. Anti-essentialist feminists are 
also more willing to acknowledge that women can and do oppress oth-
er women. [Anti-essentialist scholars] have stressed the importance of 
a ‘bottom up’ feminism centering on the experience of women of color 
and working class women, whose stories tend to be eclipsed in main-
stream feminism agendas. 
Chamallas, supra note 17, at 168 (footnotes omitted).  
 181.  Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 359, 365 (1993) (“[T]he image of Jezebel, a woman governed by 
her sexual desires, legitimated white men’s sexual abuse of Black women.”).  
 182. See id. (“[T]he social meaning of rape has centered on a racialized sex-
ual mythology arising from slavery. This mythology defines Black women as 
sexual objects, while it defines Black men as sexual predators. The image of 
the sexually loose woman who is unrapable, who always consents, and who is 
therefore unprotected by the law, is a Black woman.”).  
 183. See Marcotte, supra note 100 (“Black female sexuality has always 
been understood from without to be deviant, hyper, and excessive. Therefore, 
the word slut has not been used to discipline (shame) us into chaste moral cat-
egories, as we have largely been understood to be unable to practice ‘normal’ 
and ‘chaste’ sexuality anyway.”).  
 184. See Regina Austin & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Mary Joe Frug’s Post-
modern Feminist Legal Manifesto Ten Years Later: Reflections on the State of 
Feminism Today, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) (“Finding safety in a closet 
of sorts, many black feminists have chosen to be silent about black women’s 
sexuality. They feared that expressions of support of sexual freedom would be 
too easily misconstrued because of the power of stigmatizing stereotypes about 
black women’s sexual promiscuity. Black feminists tended to emphasize the 
restrictive, repressive, and dangerous aspects of sexuality rather than its as-
sociation with black women’s own pleasure and agency.” (footnotes omitted)).   
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sumptions about female sexuality.185 The criticism is at times 
framed in linguistic terms. For instance: “[T]he word ‘slut’ has 
done things to my brown female body that racial privilege pre-
vents White women from ever fully understanding.”186 In a 
more fundamental critique, Black women have challenged the 
movement’s suggestion that sexuality can be practically sev-
ered from sexual violation.187
As one SlutWalk critic explains:  
  
For Black women, our struggles with sexuality are to find the space of 
recognition that exists between the hypervisibility of our social con-
struction as hoes, jezebels, hoochies, and skanks, and the invisibility 
proffered by a respectability politics that tells us it’s always safer to 
dissemble. To reclaim slut as an empowered experience of sexuality 
does not move Black women out of these binaries. We are always al-
ready sexually free, insatiable, ready to go, freaky, dirty, and by con-
sequence, unrapeable.188
Considering this background of perpetual sexualization, 
SlutWalk’s sexuality jubilee seems misguided at best, and at 
worst oppressive. Even so, many Black women have opted to 
engage with SlutWalk, rather than reject it outright.
 
189
While white women often want to deploy “woman” as a universal cat-
egory and have the nerve to get angry and defensive when Black 
women like myself point out differences in our experiences, it is Black 
 Their 
willingness to reshape the initiative suggests the possibility of 
collective action that is strengthened by a genuine response to 
diversity of experience. This challenge and the hope it entails is 
expressed by the following observation:  
 
 185. This replication of essentialist structures is somewhat surprising, giv-
en that third-wave feminism claims to repudiate the non-diverse tendencies of 
earlier generations. See Crawford, supra note 30, at 117 (“Third-wave femi-
nists also decry the lack of diversity in the second wave of feminism.”).  
 186. Griffin, supra note 43; see also Four Brief Critiques of SlutWalk’s 
Whiteness, supra note 73 (“Many communities of color have had growing 
movements against anti-woman language for good reason. For communities of 
color, even those who aren’t expressly political, there’s a visceral reaction to 
name-calling aimed at women of color, who are seemingly always the targets 
of names whose historical, cultural, social and political edge white women will 
never confront.”).  
 187. Farah Tanis, co-founder of the New York–based feminist group Black 
Women’s Blueprint (which ignited critical discourse surrounding SlutWalk) 
has noted: “Approximately 40 percent of African-American women report coer-
cive contact of a sexual nature by age 18. Part of the problem with SlutWalk in 
the United States is that it doesn’t speak to the myriad of needs and the com-
plex situations that African-American and even Asian-American, Latina and 
Native American women experience when it comes to sexual assault.” Tillet, 
supra note 43.  
 188. I Saw the Sign, supra note 56. 
 189. See, e.g., id. 
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women themselves who have demonstrated what it really means to 
care about women as a group. For we put our bodies and our psyches 
on the line to show up at events called “Slutwalks” knowing that we 
are both more vulnerable to the same violence that brought other 
women there and yet that we have little social privilege and power to 
reclaim the terms in the ways that many of the others [sic] marchers 
do.190
The robust and often angry discourse around SlutWalk’s 
marginalization of women of color accepts that sexual violence 
is experienced by all kinds of women.
 
191 At the same time, it ob-
serves that sexual violence is racialized,192 as are the cultural 
supports for this violence.193 For these reasons, any successful 
effort to reclaim sexuality will likely depend on where one is 
situated.194 It may be that inclusion of the perspectives of Black 
women will result in a far more critical stance toward using 
sexuality to end rape.195 This conclusion is far from certain;196
As a more general matter, the version of female sexuality 
implicitly represented by SlutWalk may not reflect the experi-
 
but the perils of sexualization are real, and they impact Black 
women in particular ways.  
 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 187.  
 192. See An Open Letter from Black Women to the SlutWalk, BLACK WOM-
EN’S BLUEPRINT (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id= 
232501930131880 (demanding that SlutWalk acknowledge the significance of 
the word “rape” as “language invented to perpetuate racist/sexist structures”). 
 193. See id. (“Every tactic to gain civil and human rights must not only 
consult and consider women of color, but it must equally center all our experi-
ences and our communities in the construction, launching, delivery and sus-
tainment of that movement. We ask that SlutWalk take critical steps to be-
come cognizant of the histories of people of color and engage women of color in 
ways that respect culture, language and context.”).  
 194. See Marcotte, supra note 100 (“[I]f white women could recognize 
SlutWalk as being rooted in white female experience, it would provide an op-
portunity for them to participate in coalition and solidarity with similar 
movements that are inclusive and reflective of the experiences of women of 
color.”).  
 195. See Austin & Schneider, supra note 184, at 22 (discussing Black femi-
nists using sexuality as a tool). Austin and Schneider suggest that: 
Black women will not know that they have arrived at the point where 
they can be sexy for the sake of being sexy unless they have the re-
sources to choose to be something else instead. It is dangerous to 
think that cultural expression can be wholly divorced from the mate-
rial and political reality. 
Id. 
 196. See id. (admiring, albeit with some apparent hesitation, “the optimism 
young black feminists express about their ability to put their sexual freedom 
on the agenda or to use their sexuality as tool [sic] in the struggle for equali-
ty”).  
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ences of women who identify as members of other marginalized 
groups.197
[W]e are the ones who compose the majority of sex trafficking victims 
in this country, who comprise the majority of those sold in the mail-
order-bride system, who are the commodities offered in brothel houses 
ringing US military bases in and out of this country, who are the 
goods offered for sexual violation in prostitution. We who are and his-
torically have been the “sluts” from whom traffickers, pimps, and oth-
er “authorities” of the global sex trade realize $20 billion in earnings 
cannot, with a clear conscience, accept the term in reference to our-
selves and our struggle against sexual violence and for women’s liber-
ation.
 Sexualization might well raise special concerns for 
these women, too. For example, this description comes from a 
group of transnational women and descendants of women from 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa:  
198
And this, from a prostituted woman: 
 
If you want to know what it [is] [sic] to be a Slut, a Slut without free-
dom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of safety-then place 
yourself inside the skin of the Ultimate Slut. Women and girls inside 
most aspects of the sex trade are raped, battered and murdered what-
ever they wear, whatever environment they are placed in.199
As these accounts demonstrate, women’s sexuality is so-
cially constructed along multiple dimensions, complicating any 
one-size-fits-all approach to redefining it. Sexualization is dif-
ferently fraught for lesbians,
 
200 Muslim women,201
 
 197. In response to sustained critique, SlutWalk’s founding organizers now 
seem largely to have acknowledged this, in a series of substantive blog post-
ings on the web site. See, e.g., Racism and Anti-Racism: Why They Matter to 
Slutwalks, SLUTWALK TORONTO (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.slutwalktoronto 
.com/racism-and-anti-racism; What’s All This About Privilege?, SLUTWALK 
TORONTO (Nov. 3, 2001), http://www.slutwalktoronto.com/what’s-all-this-about 
-“privilege”.  
 indigenous 
 198. Slutwalk and Women of Color, SCISSION (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www 
.oreaddaily.blogspot.com/slutwalk-and-women-of-color.html (reproducing an 
article by AF3IRM, a transnational organization of women dedicated to femi-
nist activism). 
 199. Sarkeesian, supra note 73.  
 200. In South Africa, SlutWalk has attracted particularly strong support 
among lesbians. See Snyckers, supra note 44 (“In South Africa, if you dress in 
a certain way you are at risk of suffering the peculiarly noxious type of assault 
known as corrective rape—a form of punishment for sexual expression that is 
sometimes viewed as an attempt to ‘convert’ women to heterosexuality . . . . 
South African lesbians have recognized that their right to . . . express their 
sexuality however they like is under appalling threat, and that the SlutWalk 
fight is therefore their fight too.”).  
 201. See Walia, supra note 142 (“Sexual assaults against Muslim women 
are often minimized in our society because Muslim women are perceived as 
repressed, and therefore in need of sexual emancipation. I would much rather 
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women,202 women with disabilities,203 asexual women,204 and 
teenagers,205 among others. Poor, black, and transgendered 
women in New Orleans confront a separate constellation of 
dangers.206 And poverty itself sits uneasily with an agenda that 
privileges sexual agency,207 perhaps at the cost of attaining 
more pressing needs.208
  
  
 
have attended a ‘Do Not Rape’ Walk.” (quoting Nassim Elbardough, a commu-
nity organizer and Muslim woman)).  
 202. See id. (“The history of genocide against Indigenous women . . . goes 
beyond their attire. It is a means of gender control that is embedded within 
the intersecting processes of racism and colonialism.”).  
 203. See Cohen, supra note 94 (“[D]isabled women . . . are often considered 
asexual and undesirable,” [and] are “isolate[d] [from [SlutWalk’s] approach to 
sexual violence, despite their disproportionately high rates of victimhood.”).  
 204. See Nicole Prause & Cynthia A. Graham, Asexuality: Classification 
and Characterization, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 341, 352 (2007) (noting 
four common drawbacks stated by individuals self-identified as asexual to be 
“(1) problems establishing nonsexual, dyadic intimate relationships, (2) need-
ing to find out what problem is causing the asexuality, (3) a negative public 
perception of asexuality, and (4) missing the positive aspects of sex”). 
 205. See infra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing issues specially 
relevant to this cohort).  
 206. Aura Blogando, SlutWalk: A Stroll Through White Supremacy, TO 
CURB (May 13, 2011, 5:11 PM), http://tothecurb.wordpress.com/2011/05/13/ 
slutwalk-a-stroll-through-white-supremacy (“[B]lack, poor and transgender 
women are being disproportionately and systematically branded as criminal 
‘sex offenders’ on an online database for engaging in ‘survival sex . . . .’”).  
 207. Women in poverty have been and continue to be particularly subjected 
to stigmas and regulations associated with sexuality. See generally ANNA 
MARIE SMITH, WELFARE REFORM AND SEXUAL REGULATION (2007).  
 208. See Austin & Schneider, supra note 184, at 22 (“By all means be sexy, 
but never take your eye off the material ball.”); id. at 25 (“Women’s interest in 
sexual freedom, agency and autonomy has the potential to, but does not neces-
sarily, translate into a broader understanding of women’s experience and op-
pression in the world. And sex and sexuality has to be understood in a larger 
material context.”). As a practical matter, Harsha Walia urges feminists to de-
liberately consider the needs of “low-income women and women of colour who 
bear the brunt of institutionalized sexism—from lack of access to childcare 
and denial of reproductive justice to stratification in precarious low-wage work 
and disproportionate criminalization.” Walia, supra note 142. 
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All of this suggests that the pursuit of meaningful sexual 
agency for women requires a willingness to abandon a single 
sexuality paradigm. This is true in practice,209
3. Decontextualization 
 as in theory.  
Lastly, successful claims of sexual agency are in tension 
with a thick conception of patriarchy and its effects. This prob-
lem is highlighted by the suggestion that SlutWalk brings 
women together “to reclaim our right to define and exercise our 
respective sexualities outside the context of patriarchy.”210
By promoting a view of sexuality that is (or can be) fully 
abstracted from social constraints, SlutWalk obscures a range 
of coercive practices—short of rape—that influence women’s 
sexual choices. While acknowledging the connection between 
nonconsensual sex and sexuality, SlutWalk decontextualizes 
consensual sex, thus immunizing it from critique.  
  
This simplifying move may well be a consequence of 
SlutWalk’s anti-rape agenda.211 Emphasizing consent as the 
boundary between sex and rape212
 
 209. A number of women engaged in sustained dialogue around SlutWalk’s 
future have voiced this sentiment. See, e.g., Tillet, supra note 
 has practical import—
43 (arguing that 
in order to become a lasting movement, SlutWalk must “integrate[], as its or-
ganizers and protesters, those women—lesbian, queer and transgendered; 
women of color, low-income women and sexually exploited workers—who are 
most vulnerable to sexual assault and more likely to be called ‘slut,’ regardless 
of what they’re wearing”); Hanalei, supra note 144 (“What will propel this 
movement forward . . . is the creation of ‘new, self-determined definitions and 
expressions of sexual liberation’ for all . . . .”).  
 210. I Saw the Sign, supra note 56.  
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 93–109 (noting SlutWalk’s anti-
rape stance as well as its celebration of female sexuality).   
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 137–44. The disappearance of con-
text need not result from a focus on consent, although there seems to be a 
strong pull in this direction. For instance, in Canada, reform efforts have led 
to legal recognition of non-consent as rape. What has transpired provides a 
cautionary tale:  
Not only are good feminine sexual subjects expected to avoid risky 
situations, they are also expected to respond assertively and decisive-
ly in the face of sexual threats and to seek immediate protection.  
  Positioned paradoxically an actively diligent “victim in waiting,” 
the idealized feminine subject produces new axes of victim-blaming 
and also functions as a standard for assessing the credibility of actual 
complainants . . . . Within recent Canadian sexual assault decisions, 
good sexual citizens are reconfigured as being like rational economic 
actors, assuming responsibility for their actions and the risks that 
they take. Under the standard of explicit consent, what is bad and un-
trustworthy is being redefined. As normalized sexual subjects are in-
creasingly reconfigured through concepts of responsibility and risk, so 
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namely, it advances a particular vision for how the law ought to 
define criminality.213 To implement this vision, consent marks 
the boundary between sex and rape.214 But even accepting that 
consent rightly serves this function,215 consensual sex remains 
deeply rooted in social context.216 What decontextualization ac-
complishes is the elision of troubling (though not illegal)217 
pressures on women’s decision making, sexual and otherwise.218
 
too is the untrustworthy complainant reconstituted. The inverse op-
posite of the rape-preventing subject is the risky woman, the woman 
who avoids personal responsibility for sexual safety, the woman who 
places herself within and occupies a space of risk. The risky woman 
slides into the traditional place of the promiscuous woman under new 
logics of consent. 
  
Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: 
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 880–82 
(2008).  
 213. See Michelle Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1423 
(2005) (“The law cannot do anything about those [women] who agree to un-
pleasant penetration from their husbands because they imagine it is their 
‘wifely duty.’ Nor can the law help a seventeen-year-old boy who agrees to sex-
ual penetration that he does not desire because he hopes it will prove he is a 
man. The law cannot do anything about a young woman who agrees to dan-
gerous, unprotected penetration in order to impress her friends. It cannot do 
anything for persons who, having suffered chronic sexual abuse as children, 
come to think of themselves as their perpetrators thought of them, and so seek 
to engage in degrading sexual acts.” (citation omitted)); Robin West, Sex, Law, 
and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 224 
(Franklin G. Miller & Allan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (“Consent works relatively 
well . . . as the demarcation of noncriminal from criminal sex . . . .”).   
 214. See infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text (discussing criminal 
law’s default rule to the contrary).  
 215. We will soon see that this understanding is rejected by the law, which 
generally requires something more than non-consent (i.e., force) in defining 
rape. See infra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.  
 216. As a more general proposition, Deborah Rhode has observed that “[t]o 
a substantial extent, our choices are socially constructed and constrained; the 
desires we develop are partly a function of the desires our culture reinforces. 
As long as gender plays an important role in shaping individual expectations 
and aspirations, expressed objectives cannot be equated with full human po-
tential.” Rhode, supra note 35, at 629. Cf. MACKINNON, supra note 42, at 135 
(attacking the notion that “pleasure and how to get it, rather than dominance 
and how to end it, is the ‘overall’ issue sexuality presents feminism”).  
 217. Again, there is properly a distinction between the two. See supra text 
accompanying note 213 (noting the law does not and should not address every 
undesirable sexual encounter).  
 218. My concern here is with women’s choices, as opposed to the content of 
their desires. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 350 (1995) (proposing a cri-
tique of agency that entails a “shift in focus from women’s pleasure to women’s 
agency”). Kathryn Abrams explains: 
Agency and pleasure occupy the opposite sides of a public/private di-
vide that retains considerable organizing power in legal thought. 
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While consent may evidence a desire for sex,219 this is not 
always the case. Instead, consent and wanting can diverge. 
When they do, women engage in sex that is neither rape, nor 
apparent cause for celebration.220
An abstracted understanding of agency tends to eliminate 
the space from which to assess the circumstances under which 
 This category of sexual con-
duct is inadequately described by an anti-rape, pro-sex plat-
form that tacitly imbues consent with the power to negate so-
cial context.  
 
Pleasure, particularly sexual pleasure, is often viewed as a highly 
personal matter which the law can facilitate, if at all, only by staying 
its hand. The notion of agency, in contrast, is rich with potential legal 
associations. The attributes associated with agency are necessary not 
only to such intimate pursuits as sexuality, but also to the range of 
public activities that constitute commercial exchange or citizenship. 
These attributes are also implicated in responsibility for injurious 
acts targeted by tort and criminal law. These are attributes with 
which the law is likely to have more continuous engagement, and 
which legal actors can more legitimately claim to have an interest in 
fostering. 
Id. at 350–51 (citations omitted). Cf. West, supra note 104, at 388 (“We should 
at least be neutral—neither critical nor confident—regarding the degree to 
which our desires, if fulfilled, will give pleasure, and whether their satiation 
will serve our interests. What we should doubt . . . are not women’s sexual de-
sires but rather women’s sexual choices, and particularly women’s choices to 
engage in sex—of any description—that is not desired.”).  
 219. A canvas of photographs from SlutWalk rallies around the nation 
shows women carrying signs that read “I [heart] consensual sex.” See, e.g., 
Alan Wilfahrt, Revealing Images at SlutWalk Minneapolis, TC DAILY PLANET 
(Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/blog/alan-wilfahrt/revealing 
-images-slutwalk-minneapolis.  
 220. Robin West has done groundbreaking work in this area. Most recently, 
she develops the “possibility that the sexual choices women make, when those 
choices are contrary to felt desires, are harmful.” West, supra note 213, at 246. 
In particular, consensual sex that is unwanted and unwelcome “often carries 
harms to the personhood, autonomy, integrity, and identity of the person who 
consents to it.” Id. at 224. I am somewhat skeptical that there is “a way to cap-
ture, descriptively, the subclass of unwanted consensual sex that is harmful 
from that which is not,” id. at 238, without resorting to a framework that priv-
ileges one or another conception of worthwhile sex or, alternatively, conflating 
what West refers to as “welcomeness” with desire (which she does not purport 
to do); id. at 239. Perhaps the evolution of a more developed welcome-
ness/unwelcomeness description will alleviate this concern. For now, I wonder 
how we might go about assessing a woman’s motivation to engage in sex. Sug-
gesting reasons that are “not necessarily harmful,” and therefore likely wel-
come, West offers a list that includes friendship, love, trust, and gratitude. Id. 
It seems that these criteria favor sex within relationships of one sort or anoth-
er. Perhaps this is justifiable; if not, the motivations deemed harmless could 
give way to a more encompassing notion of welcomeness. At some point, how-
ever, if the construction becomes too elastic, it may lose its meaning as a 
marker of something other than desire.  
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it is exercised. By contextualizing consent, it is possible to gen-
erate an account of what unwanted consensual sex looks like. 
Consider Robin West’s helpful explanation:  
Heterosexual women and girls, married or not, consent to a good bit of 
unwanted sex with men that they patently don’t desire, from hook-
ups to dates to boyfriends to cohabitators, to avoid a hassle or a bad 
mood the endurance of which wouldn’t be worth the effort, to ensure 
their own or their children’s financial security, to lessen the risk of fu-
ture physical attacks, to garner their peers’ approval, to win the ap-
proval of a high-status man or boy, to earn a paycheck or a promotion 
or an undeserved A on a college paper, to feed a drug habit, to sur-
vive, or to smooth troubled domestic waters. Women and girls do so 
from motives of self-aggrandizement, from an instinct for survival, 
out of concern for their children, from simple altruism, from friend-
ship or love, or because they have been taught to do so. But whatever 
the reason, some women and girls have a good bit of sex a good bit of 
the time that they patently do not desire.221
Upon consideration, it becomes clear that women, whether 
or not they are married,
 
222 make decisions about whether to 
consent to sex in a fraught social context.223
 
 221. Id. at 236. West goes on to posit that “participation by many women 
and girls, in unwanted but consensual opposite-sex sex, particularly over time, 
carries with it harms that are different from those that attend to wanted con-
sensual sex, are often serious, and are not only unregulated by law but also 
largely unrecognized.” Id. at 237. 
 The fallacy of 
A woman who endures unpleasant invasive sex over time has im-
planted in her body, so to speak, the truth that her subjective pleas-
ures and interests don’t matter. Her will does (the sex is consensual), 
but her pleasures don’t; they are not determinants of her body’s ac-
tions. Rather, the subjective pleasures of another determine the use 
to which she puts her body . . . . And, if it becomes a central part of a 
life that ties her existence, survival, and hence her interests to that of 
another—if unwanted sex is the raison d’etre for a way of life that 
limits her mobility, her ambition and the development of her talents 
or remunerative skills—it constitutes a threat to her autonomy, like-
wise. 
Id. at 238. 
 222. Married women’s reasons for engaging in sex warrant special consid-
eration: 
For years—centuries—married women have consented to sex that 
they do not want with their husbands either out of a sense of religious 
obligation, out of fear of their husbands’ violence, or from their under-
standing of the requirements of their wifely role. Until well into the 
twentieth century, in this country alone, a married woman’s consent 
was not required by law—forcible sex without consent between a man 
and his wife was not rape—and her pleasure and desire likewise were 
either irrelevant or their importance minimized by social norm. It was 
her availability that was expected of her, and that defined her sexual 
being, not her rapturous participation.  
Id. at 235–36.  
 223. As Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer Rothman have observed, “sexual 
double standards can influence individuals’ experiences within the relation-
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equating consent with desire may be especially pronounced for 
teenage girls, whose sexual experiences are often unwanted 
and whose identities are not yet fully formed.224 Separate con-
cerns arise with regard to many college women, whose expres-
sions of sexuality are embedded in a pervasive “hookup cul-
ture.”225
Contextualizing women’s choices is fully consistent with an 
affirmative conception of female sexuality—one in which desire 
and consent are indeed aligned.
 
226
 
ships celebrated by the sex-in-service-to-intimacy paradigm. In their most 
basic incarnation, these sexual double standards reserve sexual desire and 
pleasure for men, assuming that women either do not or should not enjoy sex.” 
Rosenbury & Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, supra note 178, at 840. 
 But when sexual decision 
making is rooted in social context, the possibility of a diver-
gence between the two also becomes readily apparent. Exposing 
 224. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating 
Modern Statutory Rape Law, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 109, 112–13 (2004) 
(“While girls may dress and act like sexy women, they are still girls. . . . A 
multiplicity of factors induce girls to consent to sex: to feel liked or loved, to 
feel closer to someone, to become popular. Desire often is not the motivating 
force in girls’ sexual exploration.” (citations omitted)). For an empirical study 
of girls’ experiences with first intercourse, see Joyce Abma et al., Young Wom-
en’s Degree of Control over First Intercourse: An Exploratory Analysis, 30 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 12, 17 (2008) (finding that “substantial numbers of young wom-
en voluntarily participated in a first sexual experience about which they felt 
ambivalent or negative”). The sexual behaviors of teenage girls cannot be ab-
stracted from a backdrop of pervasive sexual violation. According to the latest 
research, over forty percent of female rape victims are first raped before the 
age of eighteen. NISVS, supra note 1, at 25.  
 225. See Paula England et al., Hooking Up and Forming Romantic Rela-
tionships on Today’s College Campuses, in THE GENDERED SOCIETY READER 
531 (M. Kimmel & A. Aronson eds., 2008) (discussing orgasm gap, and nonre-
ciprocal oral sex). Researchers have concluded that, “equal opportunity for 
women appears to have gone farther in the educational and career world than 
in the college sexual scene.” Id. at *12. See also Julie A. Reid et al., Casual 
Hookups to Formal Dates: Refining the Boundaries of the Sexual Double 
Standard, 25 GENDER & SOC’Y 545, 564 (2011) (identifying a sexual script that 
“does not fully embrace women’s sexual agency and may present particular 
quandaries for women around sexuality. It implies that women are sexual be-
ings, but also suggests women need more of an excuse to act on their sexual 
desires, such as the consumption of alcohol and the expectation of anonymity. 
This new script instructs women to ‘be desirable but not too desiring. . . .’”). In 
this context, it should also be noted that more than three quarters of female 
rape victims are first raped before the age of twenty-five. NISVS, supra note 1, 
at 25.  
 226. Dennis Patterson reiterates Zillah Eisenstein’s assertion, stating that 
“there is no (one) such thing as ‘female sexuality.’ On the contrary, there are 
many ways to think about female sexuality.” Dennis Patterson, Postmodern-
ism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 301 (1992) (citing ZILLAH R. 
EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 172–73 (1988)).  
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this divide, and the pressures that contribute to it, begins to 
unfetter agency.  
C. SEXUAL AGENCY CONCEPTUALIZED 
Sexual agency marries SlutWalk’s anti-rape and pro-sex 
commitments, though this function has been mostly overlooked. 
On inspection, we have observed that sexual agency (as op-
posed to sex itself) is integral to women’s equality. We have al-
so discovered that sexual agency presents profound dilemmas 
that have yet to be adequately addressed in practice227 or in le-
gal theory.228
Accounting for objectification, sexualization, and 
decontextualization enriches our understanding of sexual agen-
cy
  
229
 
 227. Although this may change over time, SlutWalk has yet to confront the 
tensions I identify here.  
 and the extent to which it is constrained—incomplete and 
 228. There are notable exceptions. Kathryn Abrams has offered this reflec-
tion on how agency may operate under constraints:  
A glimpse into the operation of institutions, or a vivid experiential in-
sight into their own constraint, may move such women to grasp a vi-
sion of themselves or an explanation of their lives in particular set-
tings that is contrary to the images propounded by dominant social 
arrangements. They may then be encouraged, by the sheer force of 
their insight, the sense of power conferred by other group-based at-
tributes, the support of other women, or the receptiveness or the re-
sistance of their first “outside” audiences, to act on this insight to al-
ter the arrangements in which they find themselves. Both the ability 
to glimpse an explanation rendered unintelligible by existing practic-
es and the ability to act on that insight to change those practices are 
forms of agency that emerge, often dramatically, in women’s lives. 
These forms of agency reflect inevitable gaps in the structures that 
produce oppression, as well as the assertion of a multiply-constructed 
will: they occur in what we might conceive as the conceptual space be-
tween social influence and social determination. 
Abrams, supra note 40, at 836–37 (citation omitted).  
 229. A number of feminist scholars have already suggested the importance 
of this work. See, e.g., Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 218, at 346 (refer-
ring to an “emerging practice of juxtaposing agency and constraint,” or “high-
lighting partial agency”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False Di-
chotomy of Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387, 399 (1993) 
(noting how sexuality “may simultaneously be a source of women’s experiences 
of victimization and oppression, and a site of women’s agency and resistance. 
If we examine both of these dimensions simultaneously, our work will be more 
meaningful, and will be more grounded in, and more reflective of, the experi-
ences of women’s lives.” (citation omitted)); supra text accompanying note 221; 
cf. Chamallas, supra note 17, at 166–67 (“The partial-agency strand of this 
newer feminism stresses possibilities for the exercise of women’s sexual agen-
cy, rather than focusing principally on our victimization. These partial-agency 
feminists regard as a key source of gender injustice the prevailing ideologies 
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always subject to the taking.230 This view of imperfect sexual 
agency is far from abstract. It contemplates rampant sexual vi-
olence by non-strangers and strangers alike, along with a cul-
ture that excuses this violence and conditions rape protection 
on sexual conformity.231 It acknowledges that women and girls 
consent to sex for reasons other than desire, and it resists the 
unthinking exaltation of this kind of sex.232 It recognizes that 
female sexuality is constructed along multiple axes, and that 
the path to liberation has as many forks.233 It is complicated,234 
both contingent and tentative.235 And it is partial, positioning 
sexual agency not as everything,236
 
that cast sex as dangerous and illegitimate, particularly for certain groups of 
women.”).  
 but as essential.  
 230. To date, Kathryn Abrams has provided the most robust conceptual 
account: 
This version of the agency critique affirms the central premise of 
dominance feminism: that women suffer systematic oppression in 
which sexualized domination by men plays a crucial role. It does 
not . . . see women’s oppression as a problem that exists largely in 
feminists’ heads. It also shares the constructivist thrust of dominance 
theory: women are not simply impeded . . . but actually shaped—in 
their fears, tastes, and choices—by sexualized oppression. This means 
that resistance to those forces of oppression, whether internal or out-
wardly focused, will inevitably be difficult or partial . . . . Yet this cri-
tique takes issue with dominance theory for its often-strategic repres-
sion of the possibility of such resistance. This muting of the agency 
theme in dominance-based accounts of the female subject provides an 
incomplete picture of contemporary women’s lives . . . . This version of 
the agency critique seeks to highlight this repressed element through 
a respectful supplementation of dominance theory.  
Abrams, supra note 218, at 354 (citation omitted).   
 231. See supra text accompanying note 10.  
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 219–25; see also Kathryn Abrams, 
Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 
103 YALE L.J. 1533, 1558 (1994) (“[E]ncouraging contextualized judgments 
about the presence and extent of coercion can be appropriate and beneficial.”).  
 233. See supra note 197.  
 234. See Abrams, supra note 232, at 1559 (urging a “more far-reaching re-
flection on appropriate stances for women toward a sometimes dangerous, 
sometimes exhilarating sexual world”).  
 235. Cf. Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Conscious-
ness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1990) (“Pragmatic method sug-
gests plural, provisional, and emergent truths. It is skeptical of universalized 
experience and absolute description.”).  
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 207–08 (raising the possibility that 
economic issues and other issues of equality might be more pressing than sex-
uality); cf. Rosenbury & Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, supra note 178, 
at 868 (suggesting that “sex may currently play such an important role in 
some people’s lives because of the historic construction of sex by the state and 
other social forces,” and expressing hope that more sexual liberty will make 
sex a less exceptional activity).  
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This conception of female sexual agency is largely absent 
from legal theory.237
III. RAPE LAW AND THE FEMALE SEXUAL SUBJECT  
 As we will now see, the same is true of 
rape law.  
SlutWalk proceeds without regard for the law’s powerful 
influence on norms of sexuality.238 This overlook is exceedingly 
problematic, since rape law’s construction of female sexuality is 
in serious conflict with the orientation advanced by SlutWalk. 
The legal treatment of female sexual subjectivity has conse-
quences that are real and unexamined.239
 
 237. Elizabeth Schneider notes “feminist work has too often been shaped 
by an incomplete and static view of women as either victims or agents.” 
Schneider, supra note 
 By advancing a non-
agentic view of women’s sexuality, the law constrains agency—
both by limiting protection from non-stranger rape, and by 
placing certain consensual sexual behaviors off-limits to “nor-
229, at 387. She continues:  
[P]ortrayal of women as solely victims or agents is neither accurate 
nor adequate to explain the complex realities of women’s lives. It is 
crucial for feminists and feminist legal theorists to understand and 
explore the role of both victimization and agency in women’s lives, 
and to translate these understandings into the theory and practice 
that we develop. 
Id. at 389 (alteration in original) (quoting Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing 
and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testi-
mony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 221 (1986)).  
 238. While sexuality is constructed by a host of extra-legal factors, the role 
of law is significant as well. As Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer Rothman have 
explained: 
A purely legal critique is unlikely to transform the current construc-
tion of sex given that so many extralegal factors also contribute to 
that construction. Legal discourse about sex has also undoubtedly 
been shaped by such extralegal forces, making it difficult to identify 
legal effects separate from the effects of other forces. Despite these 
limitations, legal critique is a necessary component of any challenge 
to the current construction of sex given the law’s power to endorse 
certain sexual practices while ignoring or punishing others. 
Rosenbury & Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, supra note 178, at 813. 
 239. Sylvia Law has observed that “[g]endered assumptions about sexuali-
ty have long denied women sexual gratification.” Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuali-
ty and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 210; see also Mar-
tha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 788–89 (1988) (discussing the double standard of sexu-
al morality, which subjected women to “harsh social penalties if they exerted 
sexual independence”); Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifes-
to (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1992) (identifying 
sexualization as a legal mechanism for constraining female sexual pleasure).  
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mal” women.240
First, the law defines rape in a manner that is decidedly 
not in keeping with a sexually agentic view of women. Most 
glaringly, non-consent is dispossessed of meaning as a marker 
of rape; force assumes this role. Moreover, the presence of con-
sent is imagined in the strangest of circumstances, including a 
woman’s total passivity. In short, by equating non-action with 
consent, the substantive law of rape effectively renders women 
sexual objects.  
 The following discussion examines two facets of 
this constructive process. 
Second, what I call the law of sexual patterns defines cer-
tain sexual behaviors on the part of women as deviant, estab-
lishing what amount to presumptions of unrapeability. By nar-
rowing the range of acceptable sexual practices, rape shield law 
further diminishes agency.241
Overall this framework represents a rather ironic inversion 
of SlutWalk’s anti-rape/pro-sex paradigm. In its stead is a re-
gime with decidedly pro-rape/anti-sex tendencies—which, given 
SlutWalk’s central preoccupations, makes its failure to engage 
with rape law all the more surprising.  
  
The following discussion exposes fault lines in the legal 
construction of female sexuality—fault lines that substantially 
weaken rape law’s normative force.242
A. THE PASSIVE WOMAN  
  
Rape has traditionally been defined as nonconsensual in-
tercourse by force, and this remains the rule in a majority of ju-
 
 240. “Concepts of sexuality are an important element of the more general 
gender script that destines men for ‘serious’ work in the world and women for 
essential, but unvalued, lives caring for others.” Law, supra note 239, at 210.  
 241. See supra text accompanying note 239 (citing Sylvia Law). Writing not 
about rape law, but about law generally, Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer 
Rothman have argued:  
[T]he governing legal regime signals that sex within a particular form 
of relationship is superior to sex in all other contexts. That signal in 
turn implies that other sexual practices are unworthy of state sup-
port. The legal and social disapproval that follows such nonconformity 
can have a powerful effect on individuals’ psyches, their relationship 
to their own sexuality, and their overall place in society. The law 
thereby continues to sustain a narrow vision of acceptable sexual ex-
pression and conduct. 
Rosenbury & Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, supra note 178, at 817–18 
(citation omitted).  
 242. Only then is it possible to consider whether (and if so, how) to inscribe 
sexual agency into rape law. See infra notes 314–30.  
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risdictions.243 A woman’s non-consent alone is thus insufficient 
to establish rape.244 This conception of rape is at odds with an 
agentic understanding of female sexuality,245 which starts from 
the premise that mutual consent is a sine qua non of acceptable 
sex.246 Because an existing body of scholarship criticizes the 
force requirement,247 I will not say more about it here.248
I am interested in exploring how consent is operationalized 
by the law, and ultimately how this functional understanding 
undermines women’s sexual agency. As a rule,
  
249
 
 243. Bryden, supra note 
 consent is le-
4, at 321–22 (“Even if the victim verbally declines 
sex, the encounter is not rape in most states unless the man employs ‘force.’”). 
The traditional rule has begun giving way to broader rape definitions that do 
not require force. Id. at 322 (“Although the process is far from complete, the 
long-term direction of change is clear: The concept of forcible rape is gradually 
being replaced by an array of offenses, not all of which involve force. . . . Very 
probably, this gradual expansion of rape and related offenses will continue for 
many years.”). Reflecting this trend, the FBI announced earlier this year that 
it is changing how it compiles rape statistics. Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand 
Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, http://nytimes 
.com/2012/01/07/us/politics/federal-crime-statistics-to-expand-rape-definition 
.html. For purposes of tracking data on nationwide rape, force is no longer re-
quired. Id. Instead, rape is now defined as non-consensual sex. Id.   
 244. “The traditional rule is that a successful prosecution for forcible rape 
requires proof that the female did not consent to the intercourse and that the 
sexual intercourse was secured by force. That is, where there is lack of con-
sent, but no showing of force, a forcible rape conviction is inappropriate.” 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 574 (6th ed. 2012). 
 245. It is also at odds with the premium SlutWalk places on consent. See 
supra text accompanying notes 137–53.  
 246. On this view, consensual sex, albeit lawful, may be harmful neverthe-
less. See supra text accompanying notes 219–25.  
 247. See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 4, at 322 (“Virtually all modern rape 
scholars want to modify or abolish the force requirement as an element of 
rape.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
335 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/12/1/tuerkheimer.html (addressing 
how requiring force “discounts the importance of sexual agency”); Robin West, 
Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
1442, 1445 (1993) (“Many, if not most, rape law commentators from a range of 
perspectives have addressed the under enforcement of laws against sexual as-
sault by arguing that rape should be defined simply as nonconsensual sex—by 
dropping, in effect, the force requirement altogether.”).  
 248. I will return to the issue when considering the impact of ongoing cul-
tural change on rape reform. See infra notes 307–14 and accompanying text.  
 249. There are exceptions. For instance, consent has been variously defined 
as “positive cooperation in an act or attitude as an exercise of free will,” 1 CAL. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIM. (7th ed. 2003), and as “words or overt actions . . . 
indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse,” WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2013); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(5) (West 
2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2009); State v. M.T.S., 609 
A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992).  
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gally inferred from a woman’s passive acquiescence to sex or, 
put differently, her mere submission to the same.250 The law 
sees consent in inaction, permitting sex that would be rape ab-
sent the use of this proxy.251 As others have convincingly 
shown, sexual violation is in this way concealed.252
Unremarked is that the legal equation of consent with 
submission is incompatible with female agency. By conflating 
inaction and consent, the law constructs an ultra-passive fe-
male sexuality—that is, sexuality without agency. In this ac-
count, a woman is acted upon; she experiences sex in the ab-
sence of a will (much less desire); she consents merely by being.  
  
Perhaps to partially mitigate this state of affairs, some ju-
risdictions criminalize sex with a passive victim—but only un-
der delineated circumstances. In these jurisdictions, where a 
woman’s submission is seen as resulting from physical help-
lessness,253 incapacitation,254 or intoxication,255
 
 250. See Anderson, supra note 
 the sex is 
213, at 1406 (“Traditionally, sexual consent 
has meant a woman’s passive acquiescence to the male sexual initiative.”); 
William N. Eskridge, The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 47, 58 (1995) (noting that the law “embodies an ideology of traditional 
masculinity that views man as hunter and woman as helper and breeder. . . . 
The law of sexual consent is primarily a law responsive to Victorian male fan-
tasies.”).  
 251. Particularly vexing empirical issues are raised if consent is an inter-
nal state, since non-consenting women may be passive in the face of unwanted 
sex for any number of reasons. See Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in 
Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 958 (suggesting that often “women . . . do 
what they were taught to do as girls—to remain passive in the face of a rap-
ist”). My argument here does not depend on whether consent is considered in-
ternal or external. 
 252. See Chamallas, supra note 239, at 796 (arguing how using a narrow 
definition of consent as “no more than acquiescence or submission . . . made 
the sexual exploitation of women less visible and more impervious to reform”).  
 253. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(7) (LexisNexis 2013); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.470(2) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(7) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-65(6) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(e) (West 2000); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700 (West 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1A(2) 
(West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(6) (LexisNexis 2013); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(k) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. § 609.341(9) (2000); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(d) (LexisNexis 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(g) 
(West 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(7) (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14-27.1(3) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.305(5) (West 2013); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-37-1(6) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(g) (West 2003); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(5) (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(4) (2013); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(5) (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-
8B-1(5) (LexisNexis 2013). For a comprehensive description, along with the 
statutory citations contained in this note and infra notes 246–47, see Patricia 
J. Falk, Rape By Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 156–73 (2002).  
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deemed unlawful (though not necessarily because it is non-
consensual).256 This legislative scheme results in the criminali-
zation of more sex,257 but it does so by maintaining that consent 
may be present under rather extraordinary circumstances.258
 
 254. See, e.g., 
 As 
such, these laws reify a view of passive female sexuality.  
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60; ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(4); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(5); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(4); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 794.011(1)(c); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 510.010(5); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(g)-(h); MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.341(7); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(i); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 130.00(6) (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(2); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.305(4); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(5); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-651(f); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(4) (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-8B-1(4).  
 255. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(6) (narcotic or intoxicating substance); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-101(4) (controlled or intoxicating substance); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(5) (drug or intoxicating substance); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 794.011(1)(c) (narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating substance); 9 GUAM CODE 
ANN. § 25.10(a)(5) (1995) (narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 707-700 (substance); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1A(1) (narcotic, an-
esthetic, or intoxicating substance); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(5) (con-
trolled or intoxicating substance); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(g) (nar-
cotic, anesthetic, or other substance); MINN STAT. § 609.341(7) (narcotic, 
anesthetic, or any substance); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(c) (LexisNexis 2013) 
(drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(i) 
(narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or other substance); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 130.00(6) (narcotic or intoxicating substance); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 163.305(4) (controlled or other intoxicating substance); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
37-1(5) (narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(f) 
(substance); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(4) (West 2013) (narcotic, anesthet-
ic, or other substance); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(4) (substance); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(4) (controlled or intoxicating substance). See general-
ly Karen M. Kramer, Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing 
Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115 (1994).  
 256. This logic is epitomized by a case in which witnesses in a vacant pub-
lic lot observed the defendant’s “bare rear end moving up and down,” while a 
woman was “lying underneath [him] . . . motionless” and “limp.” State v. M.C., 
No. 42089-5-1, 1999 WL 436617, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. June 29, 1999). The 
woman “never moved and her eyes were closed.” Id. When police arrived, the 
woman was not moving and appeared to be unconscious. Id. The defendant, 
who was charged with (and convicted of) rape under the state’s physically 
helpless provision, testified that the victim “did not move very much during 
intercourse, but maintained that she had consented to it.” Id.  
 257. The laws enable prosecutors to successfully pursue rape charges in 
cases where it might otherwise be impracticable to prove forcible nonconsen-
sual intercourse.  
 258. A small number of states deem victims who are incapacitated, help-
less, or mentally disabled incapable of consent. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-61,  
-63, -70; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-103(a)(2)(B), -125(a)(2) (2013); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-70, 73a; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020(3), .060, .090, .120; 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3), .30, .45; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.315, .375, 
.405, .411, .427; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.050, .100; Falk, supra note 
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An example illustrates this perspective.259
Monica T. reported to the Pasadena Police Department that Diaz had 
sexually assaulted her while she was unconscious. After her report, 
the police sought and received a warrant to search Diaz’s home for ev-
idence relating to the sexual assault. The police seized various items 
from Diaz’s apartment, including a videotape. The videotape did not 
depict Monica T.; instead, it was a recording of Diaz engaging in sex-
ual intercourse and other sexual acts with an unknown woman who 
appeared to be semi-conscious. 
 A California ap-
peals court relayed the facts as follows:  
  Diaz was charged with 14 sexual offenses against Monica T. and 
the unknown woman, known as Jane Doe. At trial, Monica T. testi-
fied, but Jane Doe did not. The jury viewed the videotape depicting 
Diaz engaged in sexual acts with Jane Doe. The jury acquitted Diaz of 
all counts pertaining to Monica T.,
260
 but convicted him on the five 
counts alleged against him in which Jane Doe was the victim.261
Diaz was never prosecuted for having nonconsensual sex 
with Jane Doe. Instead, he was charged under a statute that 
criminalizes the “sexual penetration of a victim who [is] unable 
to resist due to intoxication, anesthesia, or a controlled sub-
stance.”
 
262 Accordingly, the prosecutor’s theory at trial was not 
that Diaz engaged in nonconsensual sex with Doe, but rather 
that Doe was intoxicated.263 Consent was said to be “irrelevant” 
to the case.264
Consider this factual rendition against the backdrop of the 
videotape that was admitted into evidence. The videotape de-
picted sexual intercourse taking place between Diaz and Doe—
  
 
253, at 163 (“With respect to the relationship between victim incapacity and 
consent, eight jurisdictions in this category explicitly provide that mentally 
incapacitated, physically helpless, or mentally disabled persons are incapable 
of consent.”). In these jurisdictions, the law eases the prosecutor’s burden of 
proving non-consent in cases where, absent a special rule, general assump-
tions about female passivity might effectively preclude a rape conviction.  
 259. People v. Diaz, No. B185735, 2007 WL 3015448 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 
2007). 
 260. Of course we have no way of knowing why the jury acquitted the de-
fendant of raping the woman who testified. 
 261. Id. at *1. 
 262. Id. at *7 (describing CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(e) (2013)). Diaz was also 
convicted of two counts of oral copulation by means of intoxication, anesthesia 
or controlled substance, and two counts of rape by intoxication, anesthesia or 
controlled substance. Id. at *1. 
 263. Id. at *4. The prosecutor’s summation made this point abundantly 
clear: “The difference with intoxication and—the Legislature is very smart in 
this regard—is actual consent. . . . Actual consent is irrelevant to any sexual 
charge that involves intoxication. . . . Your job is not to determine whether or 
not she agreed to this . . . it’s just irrelevant.”). Id. 
 264. Id.  
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or, as the court more aptly explained, Diaz “captured the sex 
acts he performed on videotape.”265
For much of the video, Jane Doe lies limp and motionless, with her 
eyes closed. She periodically attempts to roll to her side, to cover her 
vaginal area with her hands, or to close her legs as Diaz positions 
himself to assault her. She moans and mumbles, often incoherently, 
slurring the few words and phrases she does say. Diaz drags her 
across the bed to arrange her limbs and position her body for the 
camera, but he is hampered by her limpness and her tendency to roll 
onto her side as soon as he lets go of her legs. He slaps her repeatedly 
and appears to attempt to rouse her from her stupor to cause her to 
perform sex acts on him.  
 Here is the fuller descrip-
tion:  
On appeal, Diaz claimed that admission of this videotape 
was an error.266 The court rejected this argument, but only be-
cause consent was not an issue in the case.267 According to the 
court’s opinion, the tape was probative of Doe’s “condition while 
Diaz was performing sexual acts upon her.”268 Doe’s condition 
was relevant, not whether she consented,269 and the tape was 
therefore, properly admitted. Moreover, the court emphasized 
that the crime that Diaz was charged with “depend[s] not on an 
unwilling victim but on an incapacitated one.”270
 
 265. Id. at *5. 
 The law thus 
 266. Id. at *3. The court’s fuller explanation reads as follows: 
Diaz argues that the videotape of his sexual conduct with Jane Doe 
should not have been admitted because it violates his Sixth Amend-
ment rights and because it is hearsay that is not admissible under 
any exception to the hearsay rule. Both of Diaz’s arguments are prem-
ised on the view that the evidentiary value of the videotape was to 
show consent or lack thereof. Diaz argues that consent is not neces-
sarily verbal, at least in this sexual context, for in the course of sexual 
fantasy and role-playing, a woman could be saying “no” but meaning 
“yes.” Diaz argues that because Jane Doe’s state of mind is relevant to 
determining whether her repeated use of the words “No,” “Stop,” and 
similar negative responses to the sexual conduct Diaz was engaging 
in were actually intended to deny or withdraw consent, the state-
ments on the tape were inadmissible hearsay and testimonial state-
ments.  
Id. (citation omitted).  
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. Elaborating on Doe’s condition, the court continued: “her mostly 
motionless body, her grogginess and lack of alertness, her slurred speech and 
frequent incoherence, her failure to rouse unless slapped (and sometimes even 
when slapped), and other indicia of her level of impairment.” Id.  
 269. Id. (“The evidentiary value of the videotape was not to demonstrate 
that Jane Doe gave or did not give consent . . . .”). Perhaps this is why the 
court did not dwell on the fact that Doe repeatedly said “No” and “Stop,” and 
exhibited “similar negative responses to the sexual conduct.” Id.  
 270. Id. “Diaz was not charged with committing oral copulation, copulation 
with a foreign object, and rape because he lacked Jane Doe’s consent—he was 
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suggests that, even in her condition, Jane Doe could have con-
sented; Mark Diaz’s conviction is in keeping with this perspec-
tive on consent.  
According to this view, consent may be manifested by a 
woman who is undisputedly “limp and motionless,” in a “stu-
por.”271 This representation of female sexuality, though ex-
treme, is wholly consistent with rape law’s general approach to 
women’s submission. A woman who does nothing to indicate 
her willingness to engage in sex may nonetheless be viewed as 
consenting.272
B. THE SLUT 
 Regardless of whether passivity co-occurs with 
other debilitating conditions, assuming consent from inaction 
denies women’s sexual subjectivity.  
Rape law negates female sexual agency in yet another way, 
by placing certain sexual conduct outside of the bounds of ac-
ceptability.273 The practice of judging sex is framed by an excep-
tion to the rape shield rule that allows the evidentiary admis-
sion of a woman’s sexual history where this history is deemed 
“patterned.”274 A woman’s past sexual conduct tends to be con-
sidered probative of her tendency to consent when that conduct 
is perceived as deviant.275 The effect of this practice is to cir-
cumscribe normal female sexuality. Both anti-rape and pro-sex 
ideals are undermined. Women whose pasts involve consensual 
sex of a disapproved kind are presumed to be “unrapeable.”276
 
charged with the specific versions of those offenses that depend not on an un-
willing victim but on an incapacitated one.” Id.  
 
 271. Id. at *5. 
 272. See Chamallas, supra note 239, at 795 (“Consent is a devilishly malle-
able term which may describe a wide spectrum of responsive behavior, ranging 
from the mere failure to engage in active resistance, to active participation in 
and encouragement of another’s initiatives. For that reason, a decision as to 
what conduct constitutes consent in any particular context may mask value 
judgments implicit in the choice of definition.” (footnote omitted)). 
 273. See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1461 (2012) (exploring this constructive process by focusing exclusively 
on the jurisprudence of sexual patterns).  
 274. Id. at 1462. 
 275. See id.; infra notes 286–301 and accompanying text.  
 276. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 273, at 1477 (explaining that “[c]ertain 
sexual histories give rise to a presumption that the victim consented on the 
occasion in question. . . .” and defining this presumption as a “presumption of 
unrapeability”). The notion of unrapeability has been employed to describe the 
aggregate effects of pervasive biases in law and society. For instance, black 
women, married women, prostitutes, and gay men have been, and to varying 
degrees continue to be, deemed unrapeable. See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & 
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Certain consensual sexual behavior—the kind judges believe is 
improper for women—is also delegitimized.277
We must first understand the doctrinal framework that fa-
cilitates a remarkably non-agentic construction of female sexu-
ality. Rape shield rules generally preclude the admission of a 
victim’s past sexual history unless the evidence satisfies an ex-
ception, which may be either legislatively defined
 The remainder of 
this section develops these claims.  
278 or rooted in 
a defendant’s constitutional right to present a meaningful de-
fense.279 One of these exceptions falls under the rubric of sexual 
pattern evidence.280
 
DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A 
MEASURE OF MAN 229 (2000) (discussing as inappropriate the widespread be-
lief that prostitutes are “looking for trouble”); Bennett Capers, The Uninten-
tional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1368 (2010) (describing the “double 
hurdle” for black rape victims who are treated as “unrapeable”). 
 
 277. See Rosenbury & Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, supra note 
178, at 813 (illustrating the law’s role in constructing sexuality); see also supra 
text accompanying note 238. 
 278. In relevant part, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 reads as follows: 
(a) PROHIBITED USES. The following evidence is not admissible in a 
civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. 
  (1) evidence offered to prove that victim engaged in other sexual 
behavior; or 
  (2) evidence offered to prove victim’s sexual predisposition. 
(b) EXCEPTIONS. 
  (1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in 
a criminal case:  
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior of-
fered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the 
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; 
(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior 
with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if of-
fered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prose-
cutor; and 
(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s con-
stitutional rights. 
FED. R. EVID. 412. For a comparison of the federal rape shield to various state 
law counterparts, see Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State 
and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 
812–915 (1986). 
 279. Numerous cases are grounded in the rights of due process, confronta-
tion, and compulsory process—collectively, the right to present a meaningful 
defense. See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006); Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).   
 280. See Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, supra note 273, at 1469 (exploring the 
“sexual pattern” exception to the rape shield rule). 
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Depending on jurisdiction, the admissibility of sexual pat-
tern evidence is governed by specific statutory exception,281 ju-
dicially-created exception,282 or purportedly fact-bound constitu-
tional analysis.283 Yet regardless of the specific mechanism for 
determining admissibility, courts discuss the worth of this type 
of evidence in a remarkably similar fashion:284 “the probative 
value of past sexual conduct is evaluated by reference to 
whether it is sufficiently patterned to mark it as distinctive.”285
In a previous study of the legal treatment of patterns, I 
concluded that the designation of a woman’s sexual conduct as 
patterned (and thus admissible) hinges on whether the conduct 
is perceived as deviant.
 
286
[I]ntuitions regarding the appropriate bounds of female sexuality in-
fluence, and perhaps even dictate, judgments about deviance. Though 
these boundaries have shifted considerably since pre-rape shield days, 
their very persistence reflects and operationalizes a patriarchal con-
ception of women as decidedly limited sexual agents. This conception 
maintains its hold on judicial imaginations just as it reinscribes con-
trol over women’s sexuality.
 ’I elaborated as follows: 
287
Without acknowledging it, courts are identifying “the point 
at which too much sex or sex of the wrong kind or sex with the 
wrong people becomes sufficiently deviant to [designate] it pat-
terned.” In this endeavor, “retrograde notions of chastity pow-
erfully influence judicial inquiry.”
 
288
 
 281. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022; MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2000); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, 
 “Sex within a monogamous 
relationship is generally considered irrelevant to later consent 
R. 412; TENN. CODE ANN. R. 412; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 
(1995) (repealed 2009). 
 282. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 757 P.2d 925 (Wash. 1988); Hardy v. 
State, 285 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)); Michelle J. Anderson, From Chasti-
ty Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield 
Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, n.247 (2002) (citing United States v. Kelly, 33 
M.J. 878 (A.C.M.R. 1991)).  
 283. See supra text accompanying note 279 (describing the constitutional 
rights at issue and leading cases interpreting these rights).  
 284. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining “relevant evidence” as evidence [hav-
ing] any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence”); FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evi-
dence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or 
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evi-
dence.”).  
 285. Tuerkheimer, supra note 273, at 1469. 
 286. See generally id. (discussing judgments about “deviant” sexual behav-
ior). 
 287. Id. at 1476.  
 288. Id. at 1489. 
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with another man.”289 In contrast, “sex outside such relation-
ships (however mainstream the acts themselves) may give rise 
to an inference of patterned behavior, informing the likelihood 
of later consent—for instance, if the victim was considered the 
‘“initiator’” of, as one court put it, a ‘“one night thing.’”290
In various ways, female sexuality that fails to conform to 
normative benchmarks
 
291 sits uneasily with the law of rape 
shield.292 Most discomfiting are acts of prostitution,293 group 
sex,294 and sadomasachism.295
 
 289. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Mustafa, 437 S.E.2d 906, 910 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1994) (affirming the exclusion of the victim’s previous sexual encounters with 
a man where the encounters occurred during an ongoing relationship). 
 In a similar fashion, sex outside 
 290. Tuerkheimer, supra note 273, at 1489 . 
 291. See Rosenbury & Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, supra note 
178, at 825 (arguing that the “new ground for restricting sexual conduct [is] 
the promotion of emotional intimacy. As such, states may find reason to . . . 
penalize sexual activities that occur outside of acceptable relationships or are 
otherwise assumed to play no role in the furtherance of emotional intimacy 
even within relationships.”).  
 292. See, e.g., State v. Brodie, 2005 WL 1431686 (N.C. Ct. App. June 21, 
2005) (exemplifying that because the defendant first raised the issue on ap-
peal, the court did not decide the admissibility of evidence that the victim pre-
viously engaged in intercourse in the presence of her child); State v. Sheline, 
955 S.W.2d 42, 44, 47 (Tenn. 1997) (illustrating that after an intermediate 
court reversed because excluded evidence “constitute[d] one episode of a dis-
tinctive pattern in which the victim met an acquaintance at a bar, was drink-
ing, and eventually had sexual relations with that person,” the state supreme 
court reinstated the conviction on grounds that the “described acts could hard-
ly be characterized as signature cases”); State v. Smart, No. 57129-0-I, 2007 
WL 959891, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2007) (rejecting the defendant’s 
claim that the court wrongly excluded evidence that “sometimes [the victim] 
would drink, hit on men she did not know, and then consent to sex,” and that 
she “had sexual relations with men she met over the Internet or on a camping 
trip”; “proffered evidence was not similar to [the defendant’s] version of the 
incident because according to him [the victim] was sober”).  
 293. See generally Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and 
Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47 (1992) (explor-
ing how the relationship between “prostitutes” and other women is shaped by 
legal responses to sexual assault of women and girls).  
 294. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 273, at 1477–82 (discussing Gagne v. 
Booker, 680 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2012)).  
 295. See State v. Archibald, No. 2006-L-047, 2007 WL 2758600 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sept. 21, 2007). On occasion, judges resist characterizing consensual sex-
ual conduct as deviant. For instance, one state appellate court grappled with 
the relevance of a victim’s past attendance at a “pure romance party,” which it 
defined as “parties held by women for their female friends at which they can 
purchase marital aids.” Id. at *7. Though the issue was not preserved on ap-
peal, the court opined: “[w]e fail to see how the victim’s alleged attendance at a 
pure romance party is evidence [of] . . . ‘kinky’ sex. Further, we do not agree 
that if a person was fond of ‘kinky’ sex, this affinity would be admissible to 
support a consent defense . . . .” Id. at *9; see also Anderson, supra note 282, at 
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of monogamy,296 sex with perceived frequency,297 sex on the part 
of teenagers,298 and sex that is woman-initiated299 are often 
deemed sufficiently deviant to be given patterned treatment.300 
In these cases, the consent requirement is diluted, creating a 
presumption of unrapeability.301
Women who behave in appropriate ways are assumed to 
approach each sexual encounter anew, while women who 
transgress sexual boundaries are suspected of proclivities to-
ward perpetual consent.
  
302 The law of sexual patterns sets the 
parameters for acceptable female sexuality and then powerfully 
reinforces them.303
  CONCLUSION   
 By placing consensual sexual conduct of a 
disfavored kind off-limits, rape law subordinates sexual agency 
to a judgment about what women ought, and ought not, to do.  
Female sexual agency has not yet found outlet in rape law, 
which remains emphatically counter to women’s sexual subjec-
tivity.304
 
131–37; Cheryl Hanna, Sex Is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal 
Law, 42 B.C. L. REV. 239, 286 (2001) (discussing the possibility of courts ex-
tending the consent doctrine to sadomasochism).  
 Identifying this dissonance introduces a new criterion 
for evaluating the criminal law’s response to rape: what concep-
tion of female sexual subjectivity is embedded in the doctrine, 
and how does it advance or suppress women’s agency? Related, 
 296. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 273, at 1490.  
 297. Id.  
 298. Id.; see also State v. Whitehead, No. W2000-01062-CCA-R3-CO, 2001 
WL 1042164, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2001) (describing evidentiary 
record containing evidence of fifteen-year-old girl’s prior sexual history, includ-
ing consensual acts with “several boys who were approximately her own age”).  
 299. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 273, at 1490.  
 300. See id.  
 301. Id. at 1477 (“Certain sexual histories give rise to an inference that the 
victim consented on the occasion in question, markedly diminishing the odds 
of a successful rape prosecution.”).  
 302. See id. at 1467 (discussing the attitude that “unchaste women [are] 
perpetually consenting”). 
 303. See Rosenbury & Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, supra note 
178, at 813 (exposing the law’s role in “channeling sex into a domesticated and 
gendered form”). 
 304. While SlutWalk has to date avoided engaging in legal critique, it is 
quite possible that the movement will evolve to recognize the influence of rape 
law on female sexuality, particularly if feminist legal scholars are involved in 
the conversation. See Austin & Schneider, supra note 184, at 15 (urging femi-
nist legal scholars to participate in “gender and race culture wars” by follow-
ing fellow, younger feminists’ “road map” indicating where legal activism is 
needed and where analysis has fallen short).  
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is the question of how the law responds to the typical non-
stranger rape.305 Together, these metrics anchor a rethinking of 
future reform.306
The movement that SlutWalk represents signifies that now 
may be an opportune time for such modernization.
  
307 Rape law 
reform can only be effective if it bears a close connection to so-
cial norms.308 Absent this convergence, legal transformation 
will do little to affect actors’ decision-making throughout the 
criminal process.309
 
 305. See supra text accompanying notes 
 Given these dynamics, SlutWalk’s efforts to 
4, 13; infra note 315 (proposing 
that the stranger rape paradigm be subverted).  
 306. Framing the inquiry in this manner allows for the possibility that 
criminal law is too blunt an instrument to fully incorporate the complex mean-
ing of sexual agency that I have begun to theorize, while still reorienting rape 
law toward female sexual subjectivity.  
 307. The American Law Institute is in the process of revisiting, for the first 
time in over fifty years, the Model Penal Code provisions on rape. See Current 
Projects, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ 
ip&projectid=26 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). With regard to this effort, and to 
state legislative reform, SlutWalk’s success to date raises the prospect that 
there is sizeable demographic support for legal change previously dismissed as 
unfeasible.  
 308. Social norms scholarship has profoundly influenced criminal law 
scholarship. Dan M. Kahan’s work on social norms has focused particularly on 
rape law, which provides a “dramatic example” of the inefficacy of radical re-
form. Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms 
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 623 (2000). Kahan argues that the failure of 
rape law reform fits the profile of a self-defeating “hard shove.” Id. at 620. He 
advocates instead for a “gentle nudge”—or reform efforts somewhat consistent 
with existing norms. Id. at 624. In this regard, Vivian Berger’s remarks are 
especially provocative:  
A domain as controversial as rape law ineluctably brings to the fore 
questions about the complex connection between legal and cultural 
change. Which is the chicken, which the egg? Depending on specific 
circumstances, the likely answer is either or both. As I wrote over two 
decades ago: “To some extent and over time, the law converts as well 
as mirrors cultural norms and expectations.”  
Vivian Berger, Rape Law Reform at the Millennium: Remarks on Professor 
Bryden’s Non-Millennial Approach, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 524 (2000) 
(quoting Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the 
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 100 (1977)). 
 309. Elizabeth Iglesias has disaggregated this process as follows:  
As long as rape processing practices are embedded in a network of 
discretionary decisions, legal agents will enforce the culturally domi-
nant narratives of race and sexuality. As long as these narratives are 
racist and sexist, appeals to the criminal justice system will only rein-
scribe “[t]he disjuncture between the rape victim’s grounds for appeal-
ing to the legal system—including the violation of her right to liberty 
and self-determination—and the court’s response.” This disjuncture 
illustrates the tenuous nature of legal strategies that expect to elimi-
nate rape by reforming the criminal justice apparatus. 
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target cultural attitudes around rape—though not directed at 
the criminal justice system—take on new significance.310 The 
frontal assault on rape culture that we are witnessing may in-
deed enable a legal shift that would not otherwise be possible.311 
When the moment arises where sufficient societal consensus 
has been reached,312 the criminal law will adapt.313
 
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse, 
Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 869, 890 (1996) (alternation in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Win-
ifred Woodhull, Sexuality, Power and the Question of Rape, in FEMINISM & 
FOUCAULT: REFLECTION ON RESISTANCE 167, 173 (Irene Diamond & Lee 
Quinby eds., 1998)).  
 On this 
view, SlutWalk may well be a precursor to legal reform con-
sistent with the movement’s basic tenets. 
 310. See Myrna Raeder, Excluding Sexual Pattern Evidence of Rape Com-
plainants When the Defense Is Consent, JOTWELL (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www 
.crim.jotwell.com/excluding-sexual-pattern-evidence-of-rape-complainants 
-when-the-defense-is-consent (“Until attitudes about sex, drinking, and victim 
blaming change, rape shields are likely to continue to be inconsistently inter-
preted. This raises the question of how to change public attitudes to overcome 
moralistic reasoning that is unduly sympathetic to defendants charged with 
acquaintance rape.”).  
 311. For a discussion of this assault on rape culture, see Iglesias, supra 
note 309, at 871 (“Because the culturally dominant images of race and sexual 
identity inevitably influence the processing of rape cases through the discre-
tionary judgments of individual agents, these images and their social produc-
tion are themselves important targets for feminist legal intervention and polit-
ical struggle.”).  
 312. See Berger, supra note 308, at 523–24 (discussing the timing of re-
form). 
 313. Susan Estrich has articulated this vision for legal reform: 
We live, in short, in a time of changing sexual mores—and we are 
likely to for some time to come. In such times, the law can cling to the 
past or help move us into the future. We can continue to enforce the 
most traditional views of male aggressiveness and female passivity, 
continue to adhere to the “no means yes” philosophy and to the broad-
est understanding of seduction, until and unless change overwhelms 
us. That is not a neutral course, however; in taking it, the law (judg-
es, legislators, or prosecutors) not only reflects (a part of) society, but 
legitimates and reinforces those views. 
  Or we can use the law to move forward. It may be impossible—
and even unwise—to try to use the criminal law to change the way 
people think, to push progress to the ideal. But recognition of the lim-
its of the criminal sanction need not be taken as a justification for the 
status quo. Faced with a choice between reinforcing the old and fuel-
ing the new in a world of changing norms, it is not necessarily more 
legitimate or neutral to choose the old. There are lines to be drawn 
short of the ideal: The challenge we face in thinking about rape is to 
use the power and legitimacy of law to reinforce what is best, not 
what is worst, in our changing sexual mores.  
Estrich, supra note 4, at 1181 (citations omitted). 
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How should rape law respond to women’s global mobiliza-
tion around sexual freedom, along with the cultural migration 
that this development simultaneously portends and mani-
fests?314 As an overarching principle, the criminal law should 
insist on the normative value of agency. This entails recon-
structing the female sexual subject in order that agency be ad-
vanced—or, at minimum, not be impeded. To accomplish this 
aim, the standard rape paradigm must fundamentally shift. 
Contemporary approaches to sexual violence rest on a mythical 
understanding of rape as primarily perpetrated by strangers.315 
Because most victims in fact know their rapist,316 the criminal 
justice system’s emphasis on stranger rape317 defies reality.318 
As a consequence, most “real” rape gets a pass.319
 
 314. My ambition here is not to propose a specific reform agenda, but to 
begin describing how an emerging conception of sexual agency might be writ-
ten into rape law. In other words, I introduce the broad parameters of legal 
change addressed to both anti-rape and pro-sex norms.  
  
 315. See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack 
of Knowledge, Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus 
Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 220 (2011) (“[Our s]ociety con-
tinues to hold onto many persistent myths about sexual violence. One such 
myth is that of the stranger rapist. In the public imagination, a rapist is still 
someone who jumps a woman in a dark alley late at night—someone she has 
never seen before and may never see again, depending on whether he is 
caught.”); see also Capers, supra note 276, at 1390 (“It has not mattered that 
the vast majority of rapes are intraracial, acquaintance rapes. . . . [W]e have 
imagined the ‘classic rape’ as interracial, stranger rape . . . .”).  
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2 (citing recent statistics to this 
effect).  
 317. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Capers, supra note 
276, at 1386 (“The rape laws in this country, whatever the black letter law 
may have said or may say, have always been obsessed with certain types of 
rapists (strangers and black men) and certain types of rape victims (white, 
pure, demure, chaste, and of the right class). Indeed, there are parallels be-
tween rape law’s obsession with strangers and black men. It is quite possible 
that the concern with stranger rape was predicated on a concern for interclass 
rape. As with interracial rape, which was concerned primarily with the rape of 
white women by nonwhites, interclass rape was also unidirectional—
concerned primarily with the rape of the not-poor by the poor. This perhaps 
explains why the law developed in such a way to facilitate interclass and in-
terracial rape prosecutions. This perhaps explains why the law, for the longest 
time, was indifferent to marital rape and to acquaintance rape, both assumed 
to be intraclass and intraracial.” (citations omitted)). 
 318. See Iglesias, supra note 309, at 894 (“[T]he resources deployed to pro-
mote rape as hate crime as the dominant cultural image of rape channel the 
socio-political struggle over rape around a set of ideas and practices that ap-
pear trivial, if not completely irrelevant, when contrasted to the struggles or-
ganized around the images of rape as sex and rape as power. Rape as hate 
crime suggests that women are relatively safe so long as they avoid dark alleys 
and take other appropriate steps to reduce their vulnerability to the depraved 
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To advance an anti-rape agenda, the law’s stranger rape 
paradigm should be deliberately upended.320 A separate crime 
of non-stranger rape could go some way toward achieving this 
goal. To be sure, enacting a non-stranger rape statute raises 
difficult questions of penalty,321 particularly in relation to the 
jurisdiction’s existing statutory framework for sexual offenses. 
Even so, a separate crime would have the distinct advantage of 
removing relationship as a practical defense to rape.322 Moreo-
ver, it would reflect and reinforce cultural pressure to recognize 
the pervasiveness (and most common sources) of women’s sex-
ual violation..323
With or without a separate crime of non-stranger rape, 
several doctrinal reforms might allow for greater prosecution of 
  
 
and deranged who are stalking the streets, usually at night. This account of 
causes and cures feeds certain struggles and suppresses others.”).  
 319. I am using “real” rape to mean actual, stranger and non-stranger 
rape, which stands in stark contrast to the formulation of “real” rape famously 
articulated by Susan Estrich: 
At one end of the spectrum is the “real” rape, what I will call the tra-
ditional rape: A stranger puts a gun to the head of his victim, threat-
ens to kill her or beats her, and then engages in intercourse. In that 
case, the law—judges, statutes, prosecutors and all—generally 
acknowledges that a serious crime has been committed. But most cas-
es deviate in one or many respects from this clear picture, making in-
terpretation far more complex. Where less force is used or no other 
physical injury is inflicted, where threats are inarticulate, where the 
two know each other, where the setting is not an alley but a bedroom, 
where the initial contact was not a kidnapping but a date, where the 
woman says no but does not fight, the understanding is different. In 
such cases, the law, as reflected in the opinions of the courts, the in-
terpretation, if not the words, of the statutes, and the decisions of 
those within the criminal justice system, often tell us that no crime 
has taken place and that fault, if any is to be recognized, belongs with 
the woman. In concluding that such acts—what I call, for lack of a 
better title, “non-traditional” rapes—are not criminal, and worse, that 
the woman must bear any guilt, the law has reflected, legitimized, 
and enforced a view of sex and women which celebrates male aggres-
siveness and punishes female passivity. And that vision, while under 
attack in recent years, continues to be a dominant force in our society 
and in the law of rape.  
Estrich, supra note 4, at 1092.   
 320. See Capers, supra note 276, at 1394 (asking “How do we get to a point 
where rape is rape, and all rape is real rape, regardless of race?”).  
 321. In particular, should the punishment for non-stranger rape be equal to 
that for stranger rape?  
 322. I suspect that this might also tend to deracialize rape prosecution.  
 323. See supra text accompanying note 308 (discussing Kahan on the prob-
lem of sticky norms).  
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rape, which is currently under-criminalized.324 This endeavor 
raises legitimate line-drawing concerns. Still, given that ninety 
percent of rape is inflicted by non-strangers325 and very little of 
it goes punished,326 the law is in desperate need of re-tooling. 
This might be accomplished by abolishing the force require-
ment,327 redefining consent,328 clarifying the notion of reasona-
ble mistake,329 and eliminating the evidentiary exception for 
“patterned” sexual histories.330
Each of these possibilities merits independent considera-
tion. I reference them in the aggregate not because they pro-
vide a perfect solution to the problems I have diagnosed,
  
331
The approach that I envision affirms female sexual agen-
cy—not only by protecting it, but also by refusing to circum-
scribe it. For the law to foster women’s agency, it must mean-
ingfully condemn rape—rape of strangers, rape of 
acquaintances, and rape of intimates. And for the law to mean-
ingfully condemn rape, it cannot judge female sexuality.  
 but 
in order to suggest a more general proposition. The type of re-
form that will improve the criminal justice system’s response to 
rape is reform that will facilitate the prosecution of non-
stranger rape.  
 
 
 324. See supra text accompanying note 4.  
 325. See NISVS, supra note 1 (illustrating acquaintance rape statistics). 
 326. See supra text accompanying note 13 (articulating under-enforcement 
issues). 
 327. See supra text accompanying note 247 (noting overwhelming scholarly 
consensus in this direction).  
 328. The literature on consent identifies many possible definitions. For a 
helpful classification of reform proposals including the “No Model” and the 
“Yes Model” of consent, as well as a third proposed model that sidesteps con-
sent altogether, the “Negotiation Model,” see Anderson, supra note 213, at 
1404–14, 1421–25; see also supra text accompanying note 212 (describing 
Canada’s rape law reform efforts around consent).  
 329. See Gotell, supra note 212, at 868–69 (discussing Canada’s experience 
with this endeavor).  
 330. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 273, at 1499–1503 (urging same).  
 331. See supra text accompanying note 306 (observing that the criminal 
law is a blunt instrument).  
